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ABSTRACT
The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change pre-
dicts that, in the foreseeable future, climate change will exacerbate water
problems worldwide. In the United States, we are likely to see more severe
flooding, more frequent droughts, and a rush to secure legal rights to wa-
ter supplies. Sustainable management of water resources for present and
future generations will become all the more imperative as we face increas-
ing pressure on limited supplies.
The quest for sustainable management has stimulated a movement for
greater recognition of private property rights to attain efficient use and
allocation of water. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
have encouraged nations in the developing world to conform to a market
paradigm by privatizing their water supplies. Affected communities are
often less than enthusiastic. Throughout the world, attempts to privatize
water resources have triggered a "morality play of rights versus markets,
human need versus corporate greed. " The controversy, however, is not
limited to developing countries. One of the most divisive issues in contem-
porary natural resources law in the United States is whether interests in
water are property. Absent legally recognized property rights, water mar-
kets are unlikely to thrive. According to the Restatement of Property, the
term "property" describes "legal relations between persons with respect to
a thing." Of course, not all economic relationships give rise to property
rights. Judicial treatment of water is all over the map. The Court of Fed-
eral Claims awarded California irrigators millions of dollars as compensa-
tion for a regulatory taking of their water rights when flows were curtailed
to protect endangered salmon, but a different panel of the same court sub-
sequently took that opinion to task for failing to consider whether interests
in water are property. Other federal and state courts have reached contra-
dictory results as well.
To unbundle the concept of property in water, this Article uses a web
of interests as a strong yet flexible metaphor for property, complemented
by a patterning definition representing elemental strands of the web. If the
interest in question is not an irrevocable interest in the exclusive posses-
sion and use of a discrete, marketable asset, it is not property for purposes
of regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment. Viewed through this
lens, interests in water in most jurisdictions are not takings property, al-
though they may be a form of property for purposes of due process or
common law claims.
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INTRODUCTION
Water is the issue of the decade and, in all likelihood, the century.
Governing bodies around the world are grappling with significant water
issues. The United Nations General Assembly has focused the world's
attention on the imperative of ensuring access to water for drinking and
sanitation by proclaiming 2005 to 2015 as the International Decade for
Action.' Fresh water supply, which is indispensable for both human well-
being and environmental integrity, is on par with climate change as the
two physical limitations most likely to change the way we live.2
As the quest for sustainable management of water resources becomes
more urgent, a movement championing greater recognition of private
property rights to attain efficient use and allocation of water is gaining
momentum. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have
encouraged nations in the developing world to conform to a market para-
digm by privatizing their water supplies.3 Paradoxically, at the same time,
members of the international community have identified water as a basic
human right, potentially complicating the drive toward privatization. 4 It
should come as no surprise, then, that attempts to privatize water re-
sources have triggered a "morality play of rights versus markets, human
need versus corporate greed."'
The privatization controversy is not limited to the developing world.
One of the most divisive issues in contemporary natural resources law in
the United States is whether interests in water are legally recognized as
property. In the West, surface water is typically viewed as a form of pri-
vate property, while in the East it is not.6 In either case, the law is surpri-
singly unsettled; over two centuries of American caselaw have yielded no
1. See G.A. Res. 58/217, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/217 (Feb. 9 2004), available at
http://www.unesco.org/water/watercelebrations/decades/water for Iife.pdf. The declaration an-
nounces the ambitious goal of doubling the proportion of people able to obtain safe drinking water by
2015. See id. 2.
2. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5, 7 (2007) (concluding that drought is
likely to become more widespread while tropical storms become more intense), available at
http://www.aaas.org/news/press-room/climatechange/media/4th-spm2feb07.pdf.
3. VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS: PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION AND PROFIT 92 (2002); Timo-
thy O'Neill, Note, Water and Freedom: The Privatization of Water and Its Implications for Democracy
and Human Rights in the Developing World, 17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 357, 358-59
(2006).
4. See Press Release, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, Access to Safe Water
Fundamental Human Need, Basic Human Right, Says Secretary-General in Message on World Water
Day, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7738 (Mar. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/sgsm7738.html.
5. James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 94, 96
(Supp. 2006).
6. See David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of
Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3, 7-8 (2005).
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consistent answers. Divergent judicial views are illustrated by two recent
cases. In 2005, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that surface water is not
property, rejecting common law conversion claims against groundwater
pumpers,7 while just a few years earlier the Court of Federal Claims, ap-
plying California law, concluded just the opposite when supplies were
curtailed to protect endangered species. 8 Neither court provided a prin-
cipled analysis in support of its conclusion.
Why is the classification of property, or for that matter any legal in-
terest, necessary? Classification is an important pathway for human under-
standing and organizing new information. It also serves rule of law imper-
atives. Well-ordered legal systems should be based on normative prin-
ciples that ensure against arbitrary power and guide conduct in a manner
that is clear and consistent as well as fair. Absent clarity and competency,
expectations are frustrated and public and private affairs become more
difficult to accomplish.
More specifically, classifying a thing as property has tremendous legal
consequences under the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution. The Takings Clause forbids governments from taking private
property without just compensation.9 Due process ensures that no person is
deprived of property arbitrarily or without procedural safeguards.'0 In
either case, the party claiming injury must, as a threshold matter, have
some sort of property at stake.
Beyond constitutional implications, additional legal consequences flow
from classification as property. It is determinative of issues ranging from
the ability to prevent trespass, 11 conversion, 12 or nuisance under the com-
mon law,' 3 to mortgage the thing in question, 4 to freely convey it or split
it between present and future interests, 15 to receive special treatment under
federal or state tax laws,' 6 and to impose or avoid trade constraints. 7
Treating a natural resource like water as property also has significant
implications for conservation. The recognition of secure private property
rights can encourage maximum utilization of resources and foster steward-
ship and wise investment of labor and capital.'" By the same token, the
7. Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 127, 136 (Neb. 2005).
8. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. CI. 313, 324 (2001).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. See id.; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Propeny § 27 (1997).
12. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 2 (2004).
13. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 1 (2002).
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (1997).
15. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 26 (1997).
16. See James A. Fellows, Tax Issues, 30 REAL ESTATE L.J. 58, 61 n.6 (2001) (noting that rental
property and commercial buildings get special treatment under tax law).
17. See 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 4.3 (2007).
18. Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among
Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 130 (2001)
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absence of legally protected interests in property can result in a "tragedy
of the commons," where a public or commonly held resource is plundered
as each selfish-yet economically rational-actor takes steps to promote
self-interest with little regard for externalities that deplete the resource.19
On the other hand, jurisdictions that claim to recognize property rights in
water, particularly those in the western United States, have not necessarily
encouraged efficiency or conservation but rather have created incentives
for exploitation.20
Water is a uniquely essential resource with uniquely public attributes,
unlike real estate, currency, jewelry, and many other things that are
treated as property. Its uniqueness justifies an in-depth consideration of
whether it may be treated as a private commodity, subject to profit-
motivated management. This Article analyzes the nature of property in
water as a creature of positive law. To do so, it delves into the nature of
property as a normative legal construct and the nature of water as a thing
potentially subject to that construct.
Interests in water, like other tough cases at the margins of property or
"quasi-property," illustrate a broadly applicable point. Rather than being
merely relational, property rights attach to persons only with respect to
their relationship to some discrete thing, be it tangible or intangible, cor-
poreal or incorporeal.21 The inimitable aspect of property law, as opposed
to contract, tort, or public law, is its concern with things. A rational con-
ception of property must recognize both the human relationships with a
thing and the nature of the thing itself. An in-depth assessment of the na-
ture of interests in water undercuts the commonly accepted contemporary
view that property is more about legal relations among people than about
the thing itself.
Property gives a person, the owner of a thing, legal rights to control
that thing and to exclude all the world-not just specified individuals but a
large class of others-from possession or use of that thing. 2 People tend to
feel strong attachments to things known as property. Land and certain
types of personal property form important components of a person's iden-
tity and self-actualization. 23 But other things cannot be treated as property
at all in American law. Examples of things that are themselves non-
property but are elemental to important, recognizable property interests
19. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
20. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 33-34, 50
(1996) [hereinafter Freyfogle, Common Wealth]; see also Eric T. Freyfogle, The Tragedy of Fragmen-
tation, 36 VAL. U. L. REv. 307, 318-22 (2002) (discussing the harm private owners sometimes do to
their property).
21. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: INTRODUCTION & FREEHOLD INTERESTS, ch.1,
introductory note, at 3 (1936).
22. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Econom-
ics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001).
23. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 191-201 (1993).
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include human body parts (non-property), essential to medical research
and patents (property); trust (non-property), a key component of business
goodwill (property); love (non-property), often symbolized through wed-
ding rings and love songs (property); personality and appearance (non-
property), both elemental to celebrity rights to publicity (property); and
imagination (non-property), necessary for inventions, books, art, and other
forms of intellectual property.24
Instead of perpetuating the commonly employed "bundle of rights"
metaphor to describe property, we seek an organic, two-dimensional sym-
bol that better reflects property-based relationships with things. The bun-
dle metaphor does not leave room for the thing; instead, it is a one-
dimensional depiction of various interests typically associated with proper-
ty, with no prioritization or acknowledgement of attributes that must inva-
riably be present for a thing to be considered property. The bundle meta-
phor fails to assess either the character of the thing in question or the na-
ture of human relationships with it, and it also overlooks the importance of
that thing Lo related human and ecological communities.
This is not to say that there is no place for metaphor in property law.
The use of metaphor, a basic building block of human cognition, comple-
ments rule of law objectives by infusing legal classifications with the wis-
dom of commonly held experiences through visual imagery. Building on a
concept crafted by Tony Arnold, we envision property as a "web of inter-
ests," where the thing considered property is at the center and relation-
ships with the thing- incidents of private ownership as well as public and
communal rights-form the internal strands of the web and the surround-
ing webframe.25 Due to its remarkable strength and flexibility, a spider
web is considered the "Holy Grail" of biomaterials, with tremendous po-
tential for design innovation.26 Its attributes make it equally attractive for
design innovation in property law. Although Professor Arnold proposed
the web metaphor as a means of analyzing issues related to property,27 we
take it one step further, using it to determine whether property exists in
the first place. The web can only exist if its elemental strands are intact.
The same is true for property, which only exists if the elemental incidents
of property with respect to the thing in question are intact.
The web metaphor is intended to identify and describe all sorts of
property. Its application to water illustrates its potential effectiveness as a
heuristic tool. The outermost circumference of the web, or the webframe,
represents societal norms attached to the thing in question. As applied to
24. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests,
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 291-95 (2002).
25. Id. at 334.
26. Sean Kennedy, Biomimicry/Bimimetics: General Principles and Practical Examples, Scl.
CREATIVE Q., Aug. 2004, http://scq.ubc.ca/?p=321.
27. Arnold, supra note 24, at 281-84, 332-64.
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water rights, the webframe reflects the public trust doctrine, which safe-
guards public access for critical purposes such as subsistence use.2 Go-
vernmental rights and responsibilities as the trustee of the res (the water,
stream beds, and shorelines) are found here at the outer parameter of the
web. The concentric circles radiating from the center of the web represent
appropriators of the water, riparian landowners, and other people who use
the water for subsistence, recreation, or navigation; the fisheries and other
water-dependent species; and, for interstate waterbodies, upstream and
downstream states. The spoke-like strands that hold the web together
represent the elemental incidents of property. Only if these incidents are
present can the private interest in water be considered property; otherwise,
the web falls apart.
Elemental strands, or incidents, can be distilled from the laundry list
of incidents identified by A.M. Honor6 to certain key attributes: rights of
exclusive possession or control and rights of alienation.29 These elemental
strands can be calibrated with greater precision, in a manner that focuses
attention on the thing in question, through Thomas Merrill's patterning
definitions for identification of constitutional property. 30 Like Honor6's
incidents, Merrill describes a property right as an irrevocable, vested right
to exclude others, but adds that the right must relate to a discrete, market-
able asset to be considered full constitutional "takings property." 31 Thus,
the thing at the center of the web must be a discrete asset exchanged by
economic actors on a fairly regular basis, and the claimant must identify a
durable, non-ephemeral, transferable right to exclude others from possess-
ing or controlling it.
These elements dovetail with the Supreme Court's regulatory takings
jurisprudence. The requirement for a durable interest in a discrete asset
requires a distinct investment-backed expectation in the exclusive posses-
sion, use, and conveyance of the thing. 2 Exclusivity in the possession and
use of a discrete asset corresponds to whether a competing interest or reg-
ulatory restriction is inherent in "background principles" of property
law. 33 When the public interest in the thing is strong enough for a govern-
ment regulator to restrict its use, these elements must be present to support
a regulatory takings claim.34
28. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 8:18 (2005).
29. A.M. Honord, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 112-24 (A. G. Guest
ed., 1961).
30. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REv. 885,
952-60, 970-81 (2000).
31. See id. at 969, 974.
32. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
33. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-32 (1992).
34. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124-25.
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If exclusivity in the use of something of value is found, but the interest
in the thing in question is ephemeral, revocable, or non-marketable, one
might have a limited form of property for purposes of due process or
common law claims, but not a full property right for purposes of regulato-
ry takings law.35 In other words, different patterns of full ownership, li-
mited ownership, or non-ownership may emerge with respect to the same
type of thing in different contexts.
Water is a case in point. Under the doctrine of riparian reasonable
use, widely followed in the eastern United States, each user's right is cor-
relative and dependent on the needs and reasonable uses of others.36 Non-
constitutional sources of law do not treat water as a discrete, marketable
asset or allow riparian landowners an irrevocable right to exclude others
from using it.37 In the western United States, however, the notion of water
as property is evident in both common perception and in legal jurispru-
dence.38 Appropriators are authorized to put water to beneficial use, which
is considered the basis, measure, and limit of the right.39 If water is put to
beneficial use, the user develops a prior appropriation right, which is typi-
cally reflected in a state-issued permit or judicial decree.4' In most western
jurisdictions, an appropriator has a durable right to put a specific quantity
of water to an exclusive beneficial use, but the appropriator may not mere-
ly possess the water (it must be used or it is forfeited) and may not freely
convey it.41 As a result, the appropriator may have a limited form of prop-
erty for purposes of due process or common law claims, but not a full
property right for purposes of regulatory takings law.
We begin this Article with an assessment of the psychological and so-
cial need to create clearly defined legal classifications, particularly when it
comes to property. Part II delves into the physical nature of water and the
legal nature of water rights in prior appropriation jurisdictions. The web
metaphor and patterning definition for identifying property are introduced
in Part III. Part IV tests this analytical framework by applying it to tangi-
ble and intangible things that have proven most difficult to classify: infor-
mation, body parts, great works of art, and air. Finally, in Part V, we
return to water. We conclude that limited property rights in water exist
under the prior appropriation doctrine, but these are not full property
rights because the appropriator has no reasonable expectation to possess or
35. See infra Subart II.B. 1.
36. See TARLOCK, supra note 28, § 3:60 (2007).
37. See id. § 3:10 (2005).
38. See Ronald A. Christaldi, Sharing the Cup: A Proposal for the Allocation of Florida's Water
Resources, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (1996) (noting that in the western states water is
treated as property).
39. Nicole L. Johnson, Comment, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 223
(2007).
40. See id. at 221-23.
41. See id. at 228.
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convey the water as a discrete, marketable asset. Placing water in context,
at the center of the web of interests, helps explain this result. The public
interest in water, depicted by the webframe, is so compelling that, by
precluding non-use and imposing trade constraints, public access is en-
sured and private rights are correspondingly limited. The absence of those
elemental strands means that appropriators do not have full takings proper-
ty, but they may have due process or common law property.
I. CLASSIFICATION, COGNITION, AND THE RULE OF LAW
"Legal thought is, in essence, the process of categorization. "
42
Classification is an elemental tool in basic human cognition as well as
in law. The function of classification, or grouping concepts or things with
similar concepts or things, has been studied extensively by psychologists
and legal realists alike. Classification as property has special significance
to society and to proprietors, and special consequences under constitution-
al law.
A. Classification and Cognition in Psychology and Law
Cognitive psychologists describe classification as an important path-
way for learning, processing, and organizing new information. 43 Classify-
ing things and placing them in categories is a commonsense means of iden-
tification, simplification, and prediction-if one thing within a category
behaves a certain way, then other related things might, too. In the early
twentieth century, classification became a discrete line of inquiry among
legal scholars seeking coherence and consistency through the trilogy of
predictability, reliability, and clarity. Roscoe Pound explained the exercise
of classification as "a shaping and developing of traditional systematic
conceptions and traditional systematic categories in order to organize the
body of legal precepts so that they may be: (1) [s]tated effectively with a
minimum of repetition, overlapping, and potential conflict, (2) adminis-
tered effectively, (3) taught effectively, and (4) developed effectively for
new situations."4
Of course, coherence and consistency do not always go hand in hand.
At times, inconsistency can foster greater degrees of coherence by enhanc-
42. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the
Modern Concept of Property, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 325, 327 (1980).
43. See MARK H. ASHCRAFT, COGNITION 285 (4th ed. 2006).
44. Roscoe Pound, Comment, Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REv. 933, 944 (1924). Pound
found classification useful for problem-solving but expressed doubts about the "extravagant expecta-
tions as to what may be accomplished through classification of law." Id. at 938-39.
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ing other legitimate objectives, such as flexibility, responsiveness, and
innovation, and by serving as a dynamic laboratory for the development
and protection of individual and communal rights.45 But inconsistency of-
ten comes with a high price, yielding both substantive errors and percep-
tions, at least, of procedural unfairness.46 It also spawns inefficiencies due
to the lack of decisionmaking coherence, specifically, predictability, relia-
bility, and clarity.47
Classification serves important rule of law precepts by providing both
structure (consistency) and coherence.48 The rule of law is founded on the
adoption of consistent rules capable of guiding both individual conduct and
non-arbitrary dispute resolution.4 9 It also entails a conceptual link between
law and accepted principles of morality capable of commanding the assent
of those bound by the law.5
The identification of relatively clear analytical parameters through ca-
tegorization allows legal rights to be determined by law rather than by
authoritarian decisionmakers wielding unbridled discretion. 1 The resulting
predictability, reliability, and clarity breed coherence as well as consisten-
cy. 2 This promotes confidence in the rule of law and increases the effi-
ciency and accuracy of decisionmaking mechanisms, all the while protect-
ing justified expectations.53 The use of metaphor, a basic building block of
cognition and problem-solving, complements rule of law objectives by
infusing rules and legal classifications with the wisdom of commonly held
experiences through visual imagery.54
B. Classification and Properly
Justice Stewart once described property as a "broad and majestic
term[]," among the "[g]reat [constitutional] concepts ... purposely left to
45. Susan D. Franck, The Nature And Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties:
Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 68 (2005).
46. See id. at 64-66.
47. Id. at 63; see also Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521,
1584 (2005) (discussing need for consistency in treaty arbitration).
48. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 676 (1989).
49. See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1837 n.52 (2003)
(citing THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 699 (Robert Audi gen. ed., 1995)). Professor
Franck notes that the rule of law also requires accessible and fairly structured tribunals. Franck, supra
note 45, at 59-69, 79-80.
50. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLJM. L. REV. 1, 22-23 & n.108 (1997).
51. See id. at 23.
52. See Franck, supra note 45, at 65-66.
53. Id. at 63 nn.62-63 (citing Deborah J. La Fetra, Kick It up a Notch: First Amendment Protec-
tion for Commercial Speech, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1205, 1207-08, 1216 n.72 (2004); Joseph R.
Grodin, Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 570 (1994)).
54. See infra Subpart 11.C.
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gather meaning from experience. 55 Why, then, this insistence on defining
and classifying property rights?
The rule of law is particularly important when it comes to property.
Absent clear parameters to promote coherence and consistency, the con-
cept of property loses its usefulness for advancing either social or econom-
ic objectives. 56 Decisionmakers can protect public and private interests in
things subject to property rules only if they articulate a substantive, cohe-
rent definition of property." In the modern, global economy, the rule of
law is vital. Without it, those governed by the competing standards of dif-
ferent jurisdictions will be less willing and less able to adhere to the
rules.58
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith stress the numerus clausus (closed
number) rule as a design principle for property. 59 This principle demands
that property rights comport with a limited menu of standard forms.'
Standardization reduces information costs imposed on third parties; con-
versely, the creation of idiosyncratic property rights increases costs and
stifles economic and social transactions. 6'
Thomas Grey, on the other hand, argues that property rights have be-
come increasingly unimportant in liberal capitalist theory, in large part due
to the shift in legal thinking to the "bundle of rights" concept of property
as any combination of relationships among people. 6' To the contrary, far
from losing its usefulness as a legal construct, property is still a discrete
and important functional category within the law. In American society,
property is perceived as something quite different than other legal rights,
and categorization as property has important legal consequences under the
U.S. Constitution as well as federal and state statutes and the common
law.63
55. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (quoting Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
56. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation
of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239, 256 (1995).
57. Fallon, supra note 50, at 22 (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 304-05 (1985)).
58. Franck, supra note 45, at 66 & n.76 (citing, inter alia, Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989)) ("Rudimentary justice requires that those sub-
ject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes .... There are times when even a
bad rule is better than no rule at all.").
59. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3-4 (2000)
60. Id.; see also Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1107 n.4 (2003) (assessing the costs and benefits of standardization from the
communicative perspective of property).
61. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 59, at 9; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A
Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 549-50 (2005) (offering affirmation of the Mer-
rill/Smith approach).
62. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in MODERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF LIBERTY
AND PROPERTY 291, 291-93 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000).
63. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
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First and perhaps foremost, parties asserting an interest under the Tak-
ings Clause of the U.S. Constitution must demonstrate that their interest is
property to avoid dismissal.' Persons seeking protection for economic
interests under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments must also establish they have property at stake.65
In addition, statutory rights and responsibilities result when a thing is
classified as property.' Can the thing be mortgaged? Can it be freely con-
veyed or split between present and future interests? How is it treated under
laws governing inheritance? Is the depletion or conveyance of the thing, or
a commitment to conserve it, entitled to special treatment under federal or
state tax laws (like amortization or like-kind exchanges)? 67 If trade re-
straints are imposed on the thing, can an expropriation claim be asserted
under international investment commitments?68
As for the common law, claims for conversion, trespass, and nuisance
may only be asserted if a property interest is at stake.69 Absent property,
parties are left with negligence, contract, or other types of claims, some of
which may be far more difficult to prove. Negligence, for example, re-
quires breach of a duty and proximate cause, whereas conversion and tres-
pass do not.7" Also, in common law disputes between parties, the choice
between property rules and tort or contract rules has important conse-
quences in terms of remedies. Property rules are often enforced through
equitable remedies like injunctions, in contrast with tort or contractual
64. Merrill, supra note 30, at 888; see Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrap-
ment, 477 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1986) (finding that the interest in question was not property and therefore
did not provide the basis for a takings claim).
65. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672-75 (1999) (holding that a business's interest in a
statutory cause of action is not "property" under the Due Process Clause).
66. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
67. See Wiechens v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085 (D. Ariz. 2002) (recognizing a
right to use water as a property fight under Arizona law but holding that the exchange of that right for
land was not a like-kind exchange under Internal Revenue Code § 1031 because rights limited by
"priority, quantity, and duration ... [are] not sufficiently similar to the fee simple interest"); United
States v. Shurbet, 347 F.2d 103, 108-09 (5th Cir. 1965) (allowing amortization of groundwater deple-
tion).
68. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 296 (1993); Texas Farmers File Formal Notice of NAFTA Violation-Seek Damages from
Mexico for Failure to Deliver Treaty Water [Sept. 2004], W. Water L. & Pol'y Rep. (Argent
Commc'n Group) 325-26 (Oct. 2004), available at
http://www.argentco.com/htmi/f2OO41001.535005.htm (describing $500 million claim by Texas irriga-
tion district against Mexico under NAFTA Chapter 11 for failure to deliver water); Bayview Irrigation
Dist. v. United Mexican States, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/05/01 (NAFTA Arbitral Trib. June 19, 2007),
available at http://www.econonia.gob.mxlwork/sncinegociaciones/Controversias/CasosMexico/
Marzulla/documentosbasicos/bayview ing.pdf (dismissing claims for lack of jurisdiction).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822 (1979) (nuisance); id. §§ 158, 161 (trespass);
id. § 222A (conversion); Ian Ayres, Protecting Property With Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 828
(1998) (describing the scope of a property owner's right to be unencumbered by nuisance, trespass,
and conversion).
70. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 21 (2000).
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liabilities, which usually lead to monetary relief.7 Judges, of course, re-
tain discretion to deny equitable relief when the harm of such relief out-
weighs the benefit, but when it comes to property, the baseline is more
frmly rooted in equity under the theory that money cannot make the clai-
mant whole when property has been lost.72
II. WATER AND WATER RIGHTS
According to Professor Carol Rose,
If water were our chief symbol for property, we might think of
property rights . . . in a quite different way. We might think of
rights literally and figuratively as more fluid and less fenced-in;
we might think of property as entailing less of the awesome Black-
stonian power of exclusion and more of the qualities of flexibility,
reasonableness and moderation, attentiveness to others, and coop-
erative solutions to common problems."
This is a compelling statement, but it begs the question: whether inter-
ests in water are indeed Property, with a Capital P, in all of its glorious
wonder. If so, are they Property at all times and in all contexts, or just a
limited form of property, cognizable some of the time, only in some con-
texts?
A. The Nature of Water and the Public Trust Doctrine
Water is a unique resource. Its physical properties are unlike any other
natural resource or thing. It is essential to all life; few substances share
this distinction. There is no capacity for exclusive possession of water in a
stream, a lake, or even an irrigation ditch. It is constantly moving along
the surface, seeping into the ground, evaporating into the air, and being
taken up by plants, fish, and other aquatic species. Quantities are never
71. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715-16 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property
Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 442-43 (1995);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931,
931-38 (1985); Emily Sherwin, Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies, 106 YALE L.J. 2083, 2085
(1997); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 381, 395 (noting that injunctive remedies and
specific performance "have a long association with comnron-law property rights," particularly tres-
pass).
72. See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 94 (1998) ("Where a bisiness can be conducted so as not to injure
another in the use of his property, the latter is entitled to an injunction against an operation as a nuis-
ance."); H.H. Henry, Annotation, Injunction Against Repeated or Continuing Trespasses on Real
Property, 60 A.L.R.2d 310 § 3 (1958) ("[Tlhe rule is well settled . . . that injunction is a proper
remedy to restrain repeated or continuing trespasses where the legal remedy is inadequate.").
73. Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351 (1996).
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entirely certain; drought, precipitation, and variable human uses create
ever-changing circumstances.
According to Professor Joseph Sax, who has written frequently on the
nature of property rights, the uniqueness of water is universally recog-
nized:
The roots of private property in water have simply never been
deep enough to vest in water users a compensable right to diminish
lakes and rivers or to destroy the marine life within them. Water is
not like a pocket watch or a piece of furniture, which an owner
may destroy with impunity. The rights of use in water, however
long standing, should never be confused with more personal, more
fully owned, property.74
Beyond pocket watches and arm chairs, water and land-that quintes-
sential symbol of private property-are different in many ways. All people
must have access to water to satisfy their thirst and sanitary needs, but not
everyone needs to own land for there to be adequate food.75 Moreover,
surface water is migratory and difficult to apportion, while land is statio-
nary and relatively easy to divvy up into parcels.76
The physical characteristics and essential nature of water, in contrast
to land and other things, have led human societies throughout time to treat
water in a communal manner.77 The conceptual underpinnings of this ap-
proach, however, continue to evolve. Once upon a time, running waters
and oceans were deemed "too plentiful and unbounded to reduce to private
property."78 This perception gave way to the understanding that fresh wa-
ter supply is scarce and often inaccessible in areas where it is most
needed; water is an essential resource upon which entire societies depend
for survival.79 At the same time, certain aspects of both fresh water and
oceans, such as shorelines, navigable waterways, and tidal areas, are so
74. Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 482 (1989).
75. Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource,
32 ENVTL. L. 773, 798 (2002).
76. Id.
77. See Salzman, supra note 5, at 96.
78. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Proper-
ty, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 718 n.29 (1986) (citing 2 HuGo GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 190
(Kelsey trans., 1925)). As Professor Rose noted, "The 'plenitude' or 'boundlessness' exceptions...
fail to explain the 'publicness' of those properties that our traditional doctrines most strongly deemed
public property. Roadways, waterways, and submerged lands ...are hardly so copious or so un-
bounded that they are incapable of privatization. Riverbeds and shorelands can be staked out, road-
ways can be obstructed, waterways diverted, squares plowed up; in short, they can easily be 'reduced
to possession' in the classic common law manner of creating proprietary rights out of a 'commons.'"
Id. at 718.
79. See Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of
Water, 1 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 13, 13 (1994).
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necessary to individual and community survival that they are considered
part of the jus publicum-the public right-and therefore beyond the pur-
view of private ownership.'
In systems built upon Roman or English legal foundations, water is
viewed as a type of communal resource, a "public trust," where the sove-
reign retains rights and responsibilities to protect the resource for the pub-
lic. 8' Roman, English, and early American law recognized only a usufruc-
mary right in riparian landowners to use water, and then only so long as
its flow remained undiminished for use by downstream riparians.82 The
public trust doctrine is not limited to jurisdictions with Roman or English
roots. There is "an astonishingly universal regard for communal values in
water worldwide. "83 A review of Asian, African, Islamic, Latin Ameri-
can, and Native American laws reveals that the doctrine has been em-
braced by many societies with divergent legal traditions.'
The doctrine has enjoyed modem staying power in the United States
through the work of legal scholars and judicial opinions at both the federal
and state level.85 Courts have referenced it in granting public access for
navigation and fishing, 86 and, in some cases, in recognizing the right of
the public to preserve its waters to support fish and wildlife species,87
In the eastern United States, the public trust doctrine underlies the law
of riparianism, where land owners adjacent to a natural watercourse pos-
sess usufructuary rights to water that flows through or past their land, but
are liable for monetary damages or injunctive relief if they deplete the
natural flow in a way that harms other users.88 The natural flow rule was
founded on the premise that land and water flowing by it were not a com-
80. Rose, supra note 78, at 713; Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future
of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 269 (1990); Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule
of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REv. 217, 224-25 (1984). For an in-depth discussion
of the development of the public trust doctrine in the United States, see Richard J. Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine,
71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 633-41(1986).
81. See Duncan, supra note 75, at 791-92 (citing 1 SAMUEL C. WEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES 10-13 (3d ed. 1911)).
82. JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 1-3 (2d ed. 2006);
Duncan, supra note 75, at 792.
83. Erin Ryan, Comment, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the Public
Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 478 (2001).
84. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429-31 (1989).
85. Professor Rose notes that the doctrine has enjoyed three waves of popularity, the most recent
of which was jump-started by Joseph Sax. Rose, supra note 78, at 729-30 (citing Joseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471
(1970)). For analysis of state caselaw, see Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine
in State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713, 720 n.40 (1996).
86. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee,
41 U.S. 367, 406-12 (1842); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 663-66 (Ark. 1980).
87. Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 726 (Cal. 1983).
88. See Freyfogle, Common Wealth, supra note 20, at 49.
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modity for production but rather an amenity to be enjoyed for its own sake
as an attribute of "dominion" over real property by the landed English and
colonial gentry. 9 Rather than restricting waterways for enjoyment by lan-
downers, however, the usufructuary principle in effect subordinates pri-
vate rights to community interests by recognizing limited private rights of
riparian landowners to engage in both consumptive and nonconsumptive
uses, while protecting the public's right to use the streams for noncon-
sumptive uses, such as navigation and fishing.'
By the time the Industrial Revolution rolled around in the early
1800's, it became apparent that development of water resources would be
necessary to support textile mills, tanneries, and other activities.91 The
principle of undiminished natural flow evolved into the doctrine of reason-
able use,92 which allows all reasonable uses of water on the riparian tract,
even if natural flows are diminished. 93 The new doctrine retains a concern
for the public interest by prohibiting unreasonable uses that harm adjoining
neighbors or prevent public access.94 Today, the riparian doctrine, as
adopted in most eastern states, incorporates an explicit public interest con-
sideration into the definition of reasonableness. 95 Reasonableness is a ques-
tion of fact resolved by the courts on a case-to-case basis when disputes
arise.96 A riparian who experiences substantial harm will attempt to show
that the defendant's use is unreasonable through the application of a multi-
factored balancing test that considers local customs, the necessity and sui-
tability of the use to the affected area, the types of competing uses and
their importance to society, the needs of other riparians, and the fairness
of requiring either party to bear the loss.'
The riparian limitation eventually carried over into American ground-
water law as well. American courts initially followed the English doctrine
of "absolute ownership," a straightforward rule of capture allowing
whoever had the biggest pump to withdraw groundwater for use in any
fashion, anywhere the capturer pleased. 98 The majority of states soon de-
89. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law,
1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 248, 253 (1973).
90. Duncan, supra note 75, at 794.
91. See Sax, supra note 74, at 267-68.
92. Duncan, supra note 75, at 794.
93. See Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV.
1009, 1041 (2005).
94. Duncan, supra note 75, at 794-95.
95. Id. at 795.
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979).
97. See Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459 (Vt. 1856); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A
(1979).
98. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1223-24 (Exch. 1843). For a compelling view of the
doctrine's adoption by judges in America, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 105 (1977), concluding that laissez-faire assumptions played a strong
role.
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viated from that doctrine in order to prevent pernicious, wasteful results."
Most eastern jurisdictions now follow the American reasonable use doc-
trine, which allows any non-malicious, non-wasteful uses on the overlying
tract."° Others have adopted variations of several other groundwater doc-
trines, such as correlative rights, prior appropriation, or liability rules
based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'' Only a few jurisdictions
continue to adhere to "absolute ownership" as a rule governing groundwa-
ter use." 2 Ironically, this doctrine-a misnomer if ever there was one-
results in the utter lack of protection for established interests. As soon as
someone with a more powerful pump comes along, existing uses of the
aquifer can be diminished or completely eviscerated, with no legal re-
course. 103
In the American West, the scarcity of surface water resources and li-
mitations on opportunities for riparian land ownership prompted courts
and legislatures to turn away from riparianism and craft a new system of
water rights known as prior appropriation, based on the principle of "first
in time, first in right."" Although this system promotes privatization of
surface water resources to a greater extent than riparianism, legislatures,
agencies, and courts have struggled to craft legal tools to balance individu-
al rights with the collective rights of other water users and society as a
whole."°5 The public trust doctrine is frequently cited by western courts,
but it has rarely operated as a significant curb on private rights. 6 In a
marked deviation from this trend, the Supreme Court of California indi-
cated a willingness to impose the doctrine on appropriators in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court (the Mono Lake case):
The state as sovereign retains continuing supervisory control over
its navigable waters and the lands beneath those waters. This prin-
ciple, fundamental to the concept of the public trust, applies to
rights in flowing waters as well as to rights in tidelands and lake-
shores; it prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to ap-
99. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS
366 (3d ed. 2000).
100. Id. at 366, 373 (quoting Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732, 738-39 (Ala. 1995)).
101.. Id. at 366.
102. Id.; see also Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 153 (Me. 1999) (recognizing that the rule is
in the minority in America); Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, 1 S.W.3d 75, 79-81 (Tex.
1999) (affirming the rule as the law in Texas).
103. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 308 (Ohio 1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates
Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984). Frazier is merely an example of the strength of the doctrine in its
pure form. Ohio has since rejected absolute ownership and adopted the Restatement position. See
Cline, 474 N.E.2d at 327.
104. Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 2003); see infra Sub-
part II.B (detailing the prior appropriation system of surface water rights).
105. See infra Subpart II.B.
106. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST 101 (1992).
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propriate water in a manner harmful to the interests protected by
the public trust.'°7
As a result, in California, the state water board must consider the pub-
lic trust in administering water rights and in making decisions on the ap-
plication for, or transfer of, water rights.' 18 In spite of the court's bold
language, or perhaps because of it, the Mono Lake decision has had rela-
tively little impact on the exploitation of water resources in the West. The
case is frequently cited,'0 9 but few other states have embraced it as
precedent."'l Most western states do, however, scrutinize new appropria-
tions and transfers or changes in use to prevent harm to other users or to
the public interest.'
A strong parallel to the public trust doctrine can be seen in interna-
tional law, where various conventions and declarations identify water as a
basic human right, either on its own or as a necessary incident of other
human rights."x2 A few national constitutions recognize access to water as
a human right. 113 By imposing a duty on governments to guarantee access
to water supplies, the ideal of a human right to water, like the public trust
doctrine, serves as a counterbalance to privatization forces." 4
B. Appropriative Rights
Prior appropriation arose during the late 1800s as a way to maximize
the use of a scarce resource in the arid west and to promote settlement and
economic development." 5 Experiences with scarcity led western societies
107. 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983) (emphasis added).
108. See id. at 732 (concluding that the state bears a continuing duty of supervision over appropria-
tors of the state's waters in order to protect the public trust).
109. Cathy J. Lewis, The Timid Approach of the Federal Courts to the Public Trust Doctrine:
Justified Reluctance or Dereliction of Dtay?, 19 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 51, 56 (1998).
110. Reed D. Benson, "The Supreme Court of Science" Speaks on Water Rights: The National
Academy of Sciences Columbia River Report and Its Water Policy Implications, 35 ENVTL. L. 85, 123
n. 189 (2005).
111. Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review of Water Allocation in the West, 9
U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 485, 486 & n. 1 (2006) (citing multiple state statutes to that effect).
112. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 15 (2002): The Right to Water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE RIGHT TO WATER (2003), available at
http://www.who.int/water-sanitation-health/rtwrev.pdf; see also M.A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN
MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER, at ix (2004) (asserting that a human right to
water is implicit in other recognized rights).
113. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 27(1)(b). For other constitutional provisions on rights to access
water, see JOHN SCANLON ET AL., WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT? 42-46 (2004), available at
http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocuments/EPLP51EN.pdf.
114. See Sarah I. Hale, Comment, Water Privatization in the Philippines: The Need to Implement
the Human Right to Water, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 765, 769 (2006).
115. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency
in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 967 (1998).
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to believe that the gains from private resource management would out-
weigh the costs of establishing and enforcing a system of private rights." 6
Although the oft-repeated story is that westerners simply followed the
customs of the mining camps in the use and allocation of water, the under-
lying objectives were almost certainly more complex. Prior appropria-
tion's roots are as likely to be found in the populist inclinations of farmers
and homesteaders, who strongly resisted speculative investment by mono-
polistic land barons and railroad companies." 7 Territorial courts and legis-
latures refused to allow speculators to corner the market and thereby ex-
clude actual users from water resources.1
18
These populist underpinnings do not reflect anti-property sentiment,
however. To the contrary, it is commonly accepted wisdom throughout the
western United States that appropriative rights are a form of property.
119
Yet the laws applicable to water, treating it as a semi-privatized yet com-
munity-based resource and not as an ordinary commodity, are highly
unique, and apply to "virtually nothing else." 2° A legally perfected water
right, reflected in a judicial decree or an appropriative permit issued by a
state agency, is sometimes characterized as an incorporeal heredita-
ment. 121As such, a water right does not constitute ownership of the water
itself; it is instead usufructuary, or "a right to use water." 22 However,
after the water has been diverted for use from a natural source, such as a
river or lake, and placed into a stock tank, a bottle, or some other discrete
container, it may be deemed personal property. 1
23
116. Rose, supra note 78, at 718 n.29 (citing Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of
Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 177 (1975)).
117. High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719 n.3
(Colo. 2005) (citing Schorr, supra note 6, at 33, 41, 55-56).
118. See id.
119. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Special Challenges to Water Markets in Riparian States, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 305, 314-15 (2004).
120. Sax, supra note 79, at 14 ("The only other ... example where things are treated like water..
. arises with cultural properties, antiquities . . .where the nation of origin asserts a ... claim on the
property ... to prevent exports.").
121. Cori S. Parobek, Comment, Of Farmers' Takes and Fishes' Takings: Fifth Amendment Com-
pensation Claims When the Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights Collide, 27 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 182 (2003) (quoting Marcus J. Lock, Braving the Waters of Supreme Court
Takings Jurisprudence: Will the Fifth Amendment Protect Western Water Rights from Federal Envi-
ronmental Regulation?, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 76, 82 (2000)). Incorporeal hereditaments are
heritable, intangible rights in land use, such as easements, franchises, and rents. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 782 (8th ed. 2004).
122. John C. Peck, Title and Related Considerations in Conveying Kansas Water Rights, J. KAN.
B.A., Nov. 1997, at 38, 39; see John D. Leshy, A Conversation About Takings and Water Rights, 83
TEX. L. REv. 1985, 1986 (2005) (noting that both nature and the law "qualitly] the very character of
your property right [in water] in some important ways. It is not an absolute right by any means.").
123. IC KELLY KUNSCH ET AL., WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 91.8 (4th ed. 1997); Charles E. Clark,
The Assignability of Easements, Profits and Equitable Restrictions, 38 YALE L.J. 139, 150
(1928).Clark argues that an interest in water should be treated like a profit rather than "merely per-
sonal" because the interest "is sufficiently important, and such expenditures have been made in con-
templation of its assignability . . . ." Id.
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The prior appropriation regime serves as a simple way to determine
who gets to use water, how much he or she can use, and when. Priority is
given to whomever is "first in time," 24 meaning that junior users may get
water only if all senior water rights are fulfilled.125 The measure of a right
to use water is quantified by how much the actor diverts for "beneficial
use." 26 Beneficial use is typically defined by state statutes to include just
about any domestic, agricultural, or industrial activity.'27 Although waste-
ful uses are not beneficial, definitions of "waste" are generally quite le-
nient and laws prohibiting waste are rarely enforced.128 The benchmark-
historic, conventional uses and technologies-forgives many wasteful
uses. 129
Like riparianism, western water rights are appurtenant to the land on
which the water is used, but, unlike riparianism, the water need not be
used on a riparian tract. Instead, it can be applied for beneficial use any-
where, and, once secured through application for beneficial use, appropri-
ative water rights can be conveyed by deed, lease, mortgage, or inherit-
ance as an appurtenance with a conveyance of the land where the water
was initially put to use. 3° Changes in places or types of use are tightly
controlled by state statutes and common law, however, to ensure that no
harm will come to other appropriators as a result of the change.' 3' This
means that changes and transfers have been the exception rather than the
norm. In other words, even in western jurisdictions, water rights are not
viewed as an ordinary commodity, even though the ability to transfer se-
nior priorities to other uses and locations to promote more efficient or
more socially valuable uses has become increasingly desirable. 13 2
Water rights and water transfers may be further restricted by the terms
of a delivery contract with a water supplier, such as an irrigation district
or the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.' 33 Reclamation contracts typically
excuse the United States for delivery shortages in case of drought, and
they often include provisions that preserve regulatory authority to limit
124. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 863 (Cal. 2000).
125. Id.
126. Neuman, supra note 115, at 920.
127. See id. at 926-27.
128. Id. at 922, 958-61, 975.
129. See id. at 933-46.
130. See Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions in Reclamation Water Contract Deliveries: A Fifth
Amendment Taking of Property?, 36 ENVTL. L. 1331, 1336 (2006); supra note 120 and accompanying
text.
131. See Grant, supra note 130, at 1336-37.
132. See Sax, supra note 79, at 14-15.
133. See Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 497, 500 (2007) (finding that a
provision of a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation for the appropriation of water from federal
reservoir absolved the government of liability for shortages "because of drought, or other causes
which, in the opinion of the Contracting Officer, are beyond the control of the United States").
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deliveries to fulfill environmental or other needs. " In addition, external
forces, both physical and legal, operate on the appropriative system. Wa-
ter rights are limited by uncertainties imposed by hydrologic variability,
such as drought, flooding, and the extraction of hydrologically connected
groundwater.135 They are also limited by competing legal demands from
forces outside of the appropriative system, particularly requirements for
fulfilling interstate compacts as well as streamflow protections imposed by
federal treaties and federal and state environmental laws.136
What happens when external constraints result in restrictions or cur-
tailment of an appropriator's water supply? That depends in large part on
whether a water right is property for constitutional law purposes or wheth-
er it is a more limited interest of some sort.
Ill. A TAXONOMY OF PROPERTY: LOCKEAN BUNDLES, HOBBESIAN
STICKS, AND STICKY WEBS
American academic commentary on the defining characteristics of
property is "surprisingly thin," given the importance attached to characte-
rization as property in the law.'37 Those who have dug deep into the nature
and content of property tend to look at either the objectives of property
law or the standard incidents of property in search of a definition.
At least some level of consensus can be reached regarding the funda-
mental objectives of property. Property law serves several vital functions.
First, it provides a line of demarcation between individual rights and the
state's sovereign power by maximizing security through wealth and by
promoting individual expression and political freedom.'38 Property law can
also promote self-actualization through things like one's home, often re-
ferred to as one's castle, no matter how humble it may be, and items inhe-
rited from one's parents or other loved ones, cherished pieces of art, wed-
ding rings, and even automobiles.'39 For these reasons, private property
134. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. CI. 504, 535-37 (2005) (remarking that a
reduction in water deliveries to protect endangered species were unlikely to breach Bureau of Recla-
mation contracts either because the contracts contain a water shortage clause authorizing reduced
deliveries or because the sovereign acts doctrine makes government contracts subject to subsequent
legislation of general applicability); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 695
(2007) (dismissing contract claims against the Bureau of Reclamation on the basis of the sovereign acts
doctrine).
135. See TARLOCK, supra note 28, §§ 2.3-.6 (2000).
136. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (involving Colorado's overuse of water in
violation of an interstate compact with Kansas); Susan J. Buck et al., "The institutional Imperative":
Resolving Transboundary Water Conflict in Arid Agricultural Regions of the United States and the
Commonwealth of Independent States, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 595, 618-20 (1993).
137. Merrill, supra note 30, at 890-91.
138. See RADIN, supra note 23, at 197-202.
139. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 57-58 (1996) (describing "constitu-
tive property" as objects "closely related to one's personhood," like one's home or wedding ring);
RADIN, supra note 23, at 195-202.
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rights are taken more seriously than broad but amorphous rights to liberty
in American law and, arguably, in American culture more generally."
At the societal level, the rise of capitalism through privatization has
served as a corollary to democracy in many contemporary societies
worldwide, at least since the fall of the Berlin Wall.' 4 ' Recognition of
property rights provides a means of allowing persons to relate with each
other in the marketplace.'42 Property law, then, promotes the social and
economic values fostered by ownership in things of value. It helps create
and safeguard stable relationships between persons and things, allowing
both property owners and the broader community to extract the greatest
value from the thing.'43
Yet very little consensus exists regarding a definition, much less the
necessary elements, of property. Historically, property rights were viewed
as in rem, governing only those relationships closely tied to a discrete
thing.' Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, however, Wesley
Hohfeld insisted that property rights are not rights to things at all, but in-
stead are a multitude of personal rights and relationships.'45 This relation-
al, in personam approach quickly took hold, fostered by the growing field
of law and economics.' 46 It views property as any relationship between
persons with one or more legal rights bundled in virtually any combination
of incidents or attributes associated with ownership.1"' Hohfeld's effort to
reduce in rem rights to clusters of in personam rights provided the founda-
tion for the "bundle of rights" metaphor, which gained popularity among
140. RADIN, supra note 23, at 14; see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 224, 272 (1990) (explaining the rhetorical power of the "myth" of
property to our moral and legal culture, and describing property as portrayed by "Madisonian constitu-
tionalism" as "the ideal symbol for [that] vision of autonomy" because it allows us to erect a wall
between ourselves and others); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE
L.J. 549, 567-69 (2001) (arguing that protecting property protects other fundamental rights by enabl-
ing owners to dissociate from relationships with others); Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property as Entrance,
91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1890 (2005) (noting that theorists "frequently make ... [the claim] that proper-
ty rights must be protected because they constitute the very foundation for many other liberties").
141. See generally Aslam A. Jaffery, Comment, Economic Freedom and Privatization-From
Egypt and Mesopotamia to Eastern Europe, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 365 (2000).
142. Schroeder, supra note 56, at 303-04.
143. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 61, at 533, 536.
144. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 358-59; JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER
RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW (2006); MICHAEL TAGGART, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ABUSE OF RIGHTS IN
VICrORIAN ENGLAND (2002).
145. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
As Applied to Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Hohfeld argued that land was no longer
the primary basis of wealth, having been supplanted by intangible business interests. Id. This meant
that "the number of persons affected by or asserting rights in a particular property interest increased,
leading courts to replace Blackstone's absolutist conception of ownership with one that emphasized
balance among the competing interests." Duncan, supra note 75, at 779 n. 14 (citing Vandevelde,
supra note 42).
146. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 357-59.
147. See id. at 357.
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legal realists in the 1920s and 1930s and gathered even more steam with
the law and economics movement, beginning in 1960.148 Today, the pre-
dominance of the relational paradigm in American law "is undeniable." 49
But it leaves us with no commonly accepted, concrete definition of proper-
ty, leading some commentators to lament the death of property as a prin-
cipled legal concept. 15o
This Part demonstrates that, not only must we look at the thing in
question, we must also consider the context. A thing might be property in
one situation or for the purposes of one type of claim but not others. Spe-
cifically, a thing might be property for purposes of protection from com-
mon law conversion by others or from curtailment without due process,
but not for the purposes of a regulatory takings claim against the govern-
ment.' 5' Because the bundle of sticks metaphor does not capture the two-
dimensional nature of property, we propose a web of interests as a more
nuanced, yet more resilient, symbol for property.152
A. It Don't Mean a Thing if it Ain't Got that Thing'53
The U.S. Constitution lacks a definition of property, even though it
explicitly protects property from governmental invasion in several ways."'
Property interests, then, are created and defined by norms and rules flow-
ing from an independent source such as state law. 15
In contemporary jurisprudence, reflected in the Restatement (First) of
Property, the term "property" is used to describe "legal relations between
148. See MORTON J. HoRwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 9-36,
151-56 (1992); Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 365; Vandevelde, supra note 42, at 361 ("Hohfeld
both demonstrated that property does not imply any absolute or fixed set of rights in the owner and
provided a vocabulary for describing the limited nature of the owner's property.").
149. J. E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv. 711, 713
(1996).
150. See Duncan, supra note 75, at 779 n. 14 (noting that by conceiving of property as a "bundle of
legal relations," Hohfeld contributed to the subversion of property rights); Merrill & Smith, supra
note 22, at 357 ("Property has fallen out of fashion."); Schroeder, supra note 56, at 239 ("Property
was dead . . . .The coroner, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, revealed that the unity, tangibility, and
objectivity of property perceived by our ancestors was a phantom.").
151. See infra notes 202-237 and accompanying text.
152. See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813 (2003) (arguing that property rights should be classified on a gradient based
on two characteristics-the type of dominant right (usage or exclusion) and the size of the party hold-
ing that right (individual or group)-which allows forms of property to be categorized and mapped in
two-dimensional space).
153. Apologies to the memory of Duke Ellington for spinning his song to suit our purposes.
154. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
apply to both federal and state action. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
122 (1978). Federal property is explicitly addressed in Article IV, which provides Congress with the
authority to make needful rules and dispose of federal property. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
155. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).
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persons with respect to a thing.", 1 6 Of course, not all relationships entail
property rights, and therein, as they say, lies the rub. In rather circular
fashion, the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "economic uses are rights
only when they are legally protected interests."' 57 Whether such uses are
legally protected interests depends "on the substance of the enjoyment
thereof for which [the claimant] claims legal protection; [and] on the legal
relations of the adversary claimed to be under a duty to observe or com-
pensate his interests."158 This description is frustratingly vague and not at
all helpful in attempting to discern a rule of general applicability.
In Klamath Irrigation District v. United States, the U.S. Court of Fed-
eral Claims framed its struggle to define property rights in water as fol-
lows:
What is property? The derivation of the word is simple enough,
arising from the Latin proprietas or "ownership," in turn stem-
ming from proprius, meaning "own" or "proper." But, this ety-
mology reveals little. Philosophers such as Aristotle . . . and
Locke each, in turn, have debated the meaning of this term, as lat-
er did legal luminaries such as Blackstone, Madison and Holmes,
and even economists such as Coase.' 59
Among the "luminaries" cited by the Klamath court, lawyers and law
students are undoubtedly most familiar with Sir William Blackstone. The
American view of private property in land has been indelibly shaped by
Blackstone, who described it as "that sole and despotic dominion. . . over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any oth-
er." 160 Ironically, it is highly unlikely that landowners enjoyed unfettered
rights to real property when Blackstone penned this phrase, and even
Blackstone himself expressed misgivings about the notion of exclusive
dominion. 6 1 Yet the concept seems to have taken on mythical proportions
among property rights proponents and still exerts influence in the law to-
day. 162 Although the importance of exclusivity in the possession and use of
property can hardly be denied, it is not altogether clear why this is so. 1
63
156. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: INTRODUCTION & FREEHOLD INTERESTS ch. 1, introductory
note at 3 (1936); see Duncan, supra note 75, at 779 n. 14 (describing this commonly accepted defini-
tion as derivative of Wesley Holifeld's work in the late 1800s).
157. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 503 (1945).
158. Id. The Court held that the federal navigational servitude precluded a landowner's claim for
loss of property on a navigable river. Id. at 509, 511.
159. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 506 (2005); see Brian E. Gray,
The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 1-2 (2002).
160. Sandra B. Zellmer & Scott A. Johnson, Biodiversity in and Around McElligot's Pool, 38
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 490 (2002) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2).
161. Duncan, supra note 75, at 783 n.25 (citing Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or,
Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 601-02 (1998)).
162. See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77, 99-
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One explanation might be found in natural law. Aristotle viewed the
right to property as "inherent in the moral order." '64 He championed the
primacy of private property as an expression of self-love, encouraging
citizens to attend to their own affairs rather than meddling in the affairs of
others.1 65 Aristotle saw the right to exclude as a critical aspect of property
rights "because it allowed owners to display virtue by waiving this right
and sharing the benefits of property ownership with others."" 6 Similarly,
the philosopher John Locke viewed the institution of private property as
"predating society, and thus a priori."'67 According to Locke, once indi-
viduals invest their labor to enhance and safeguard their interests, the state
is forbidden from interfering with those rights because they become prop-
erty, self-evidently, as a matter of natural law. 161
Natural law, however, fails to provide either a workable definition of
property or a clear delineation of core property rights. 69 Even Blackstone,
who asserted that property is a right that "every man is entitled to enjoy,
whether out of society or in it," characterized laws relating to property not
as absolute but as qualified rights. 7° Enter Jeremy Bentham, who viewed
property as a creature of law rather than some natural force: without law,
there is no property.' 71 "Right . . . is the child of law; from real laws
come real rights; from imaginary laws, from laws of nature, fancied and
invented by poets, rhetoricians, and dealers in moral and intellectual poi-
sons, come imaginary rights, a bastard brood of monsters. ,1
72
Bentham and his succesors defined property "as a distinctive right in a
thing good against the world that promotes security of expectations about
the use and enjoyment of particular resources." 173 This positive law ap-
proach continues to enjoy wide acceptance among legal scholars and jur-
100 (1995).
163. See infra notes 219-220 and accompanying text.
164. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 61, at 541 (citing ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 5, at 25-29
(Stephen Everson ed., 1988)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Duncan, supra note 75, at 786. See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 95 (1985) (invoking Locke to support arguments
that the state can only regulate private property if it pays just compensation unless the regulation in
question restrains nuisance-like conduct or provides reciprocal advantages).
168. Duncan, supra note 75, at 786.
169. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 367,
369-70 (1991).
170. Merrill, supra note 30, at 944 n.226 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *119);
see Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603-04
(1998).
171. Duncan, supra note 75, at 786 n.42 (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION:
PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE 111, 113 (Hildreth ed. 1931)).
172. Bell and Parchomovsky, supra note 61, at 543 (citing 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Falla-
cies, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 489, 523, 501 (J. Bowring ed., 1983)).
173. Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 366.
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ists. 74 Like Bentham, the Supreme Court has put the kibosh on natural law
as an underpinning of property rights."' Bentham adherents, however,
often neglect his caveat that property rights relate to particular things. An
example can be seen in the law and economics view of property rooted in
Ronald Coase's article, The Problem of Social Cost.7 6 Coase's view of
property as having "no function other than [as a] baseline for contracting"
or allocating rights to use resources "hastened the demise of the in rem
conception of property" and stimulated the conception of property as a
cluster of in personam rights instead.' 77
If it is true that property law is just a loose collection of highly malle-
able sticks in a bundle of rights, or a mere background condition that faci-
litates exchange, then property can be defined as whatever a government
deems worthy of protection.'78 This view inevitably leads to the "positivist
trap"-quixotic, ad hoc decisionmaking resulting in too much or too little
property relative to normative expectations.' 79 It has freed the Supreme
Court "arbitrarily to embrace some provisions of nonconstitutional law
while ignoring others, all the while covering its tracks with circular argu-
ments, ipse dixits, and smoke and mirrors. "180
What is needed, then, is a tool that enables courts to craft principled,
equitable parameters on rights in things protected as property. Analytical
coherence can be brought to the notion of property first by identifying the
in rem nature of property rights as a fundamental aspect of the law. Al-
though those who believe that property is a right to a specified thing have
been accused of "a childlike lack of sophistication,"' Professors Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith have made a solid case that property rights are in
fact and indeed should be different from in personam rights:
174. Duncan, supra note 75, at 786 n.42.
175. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Merrill, supra note 30, at 944 ("[I]t
would be extremely difficult for the Court at this point in time suddenly to 'discover' a set of [natural]
property rights that originates directly in the Constitution and hence is immune from legislative mod-
ification.").
176. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also YORAM BARZEL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (2d ed. 1997) (defining property as an individual's
ability to consume a good directly or indirectly through exchange); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 36-37 (5th ed. 1998) (arguing that the creation of individual ownership rights is a
necessary condition for the efficient resource use); cf Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Prop-
erty Rules, liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1119-20 (1972) (advocating that liability should be placed on the "cheapest cost avoider" to move
society closer to optimal resource allocation); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 71 (arguing for liability
rules rather than entitlements to tangible things).
177. Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 359-60.
178. Merrill, supra note 30, at 949-50.
179. Id. at 950-51.
180. Id. at 951.
181. Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 358 (citing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE CONSTITUTION 26-29 (1977)).
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Because core property rights attach to persons only through the in-
termediary of some thing, they have an impersonality and gene-
rality that is absent from rights and privileges that attach to per-
sons directly. When we encounter a thing that is marked in the
conventional manner as being owned, we know that we are subject
to certain negative duties of abstention with respect to that thing-
not to enter upon it, not to use it, not to take it, etc. And we know
all this without having any idea who the owner of the thing actual-
ly is. In effect, these universal duties are broadcast to the world
from the thing itself.'82
Basically, Hohfeld and other legal realists "miss[] the point that prop-
erty is a relationship between subjects that is mediated through an ob-
ject."183 In systems based on English law, property rights historically were
regarded as in rem rights that attach to persons insofar as they have a rela-
tionship to a thing." The law of property, then, governs relations be-
tween owners and others to a thing in order to determine the uses to which
a thing may, or may not, be put, and to delineate spheres of power, pri-
vate and public.'85 Property law should only apply to those things for
which in rem ownership is necessary to realize the full value of the thing
vis a vis the world.'86 Such rights confer on the person, known as the
owner, the right to exclude a large and indefinite class of other persons
from the thing.'87 In contrast, property law does nothing special to protect
in personam interests, such as contracts and many types of regulatory
permits; those interests are best suited for resolution through contract,
tort, or public law mechanisms. 188
Just because the bundle of rights relational paradigm has become or-
thodoxy in American legal thought does not mean it is without fault. Prop-
erty is not just a random compilation of disparate rights.1 89 Even Black-
stone was emphatic that property was related to external things apart from
one's self, be they corporeal or incorporeal.' 90 Absent a focus on the na-
ture of the thing in question and people's relationship to that thing, free-
wheeling formulations of various sticks within bundles of rights can be
182. Id. at 359.
183. Schroeder, supra note 56, at 292.
184. Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 360.
185. See Penner, supra note 149, at 801.
186. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 61, at 580-81.
187. Id.
188. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 773, 790-92 (2001) (drawing distinctions between in rem property rights and in personam con-
tract rights).
189. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam To-day: On the Impossibility of Takings Jurisprudence, 84
GEO. L.J. 1531, 1554 (1996).
190. Schroeder, supra note 56, at 280 ("'The objects of dominion or property are things, as con-
tradistinguished from persons.'" (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES * 16)).
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readily applied to serve political ends that are neither normative nor con-
sistent. When property is deprived of substantive meaning grounded in the
relationship to some thing, individual stewardship and sustainable man-
agement may be stymied, while undue regulatory intervention and even
redistribution may be facilitated.1 91 "If property has no fixed core of mean-
ing, but is just a variable collection of interests established by social con-
vention, then there is no good reason why the state should not freely ex-
pand or, better yet, contract the list of interests in the name of the general
welfare."" 9 Since the early days of the Rehnquist Court, property rights
have been strengthened rather than diminished under the bundle of rights
rubric,'93 but the prevailing political winds could easily turn with the ap-
pointment of a different breed of judge.
Considering whether an interest in a thing enjoys the standard inci-
dents of ownership is one way to break down the concept of property, but
a list of property incidents only makes sense as criteria for identifying
property if those incidents refer to the types of things that are appropriate
objects of property law."9 The bedrock incidents of ownership are the
rights to exclusive possession or control and transferability. 95 If either
exclusivity or transferability is not present, is the relationship something
other than property, or is it perhaps some sort of "quasi-property"? 96
Conversely, if one or more incidents are present, does property necessari-
ly exist? Take transferability, for example. Just because a thing can be
traded for value does not make it property. J.E. Penner illustrates this
point:
[O]ur body parts are clearly material objects in the world, and so
like other chattels are obvious candidates for criterial objects of
property. . . .[But] [flor a thing to be held as property, we must
not conceive of it as an aspect of ourselves or our ongoing perso-
nality-rich relationships to others. The key is not alienability ...
for clearly we can deal with our body parts, our friendships, our
191. Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 365.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393, 396 (1994) (finding a taking where the
state exacted a public right-of-way in exchange for a permit); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1027-28, 1031-32 (1992) (finding a taking where the potential for development was removed
from the landowner's bundle of rights). But see Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (stating that
the destruction of "one 'strand' of the bundle [of property fights] is not a taking, because the aggregate
must be viewed in its entirety").
194. Penner, supra note 149, at 800.
195. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing Honor6's incidents of property).
196. See Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (characterizing an interest in
the collection of news as "quasi-property" as between two newspapers, "irrespective of the fights of
either as against the public").
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ability to work, and our civil rights in ways which benefit others;
such dealings do not constitute the transfer of property."
Is it also true, then, that prohibitions or restrictions on transferability
strip a thing of its potential as property? Patterning definitions can provide
a response to these questions by adding clarity and precision to the identi-
fication of personality-rich versus commodity-rich things and relation-
ships.
B. Patterning Definitions
Professor Merrill strikes a balance between coherence and consisten-
cy, and flexibility and rigidity, in his patterning definitions for constitu-
tional property. 98 He crafts a narrow definition for regulatory takings
claims,"' with broader definitions for due process claims. E"° Building on
Merrill's work, a patterning definition for common law conversion claims
can be identified as well.
Patterning definitions serve two primary purposes. First, they demon-
strate the importance of context in identifying rights to property. In addi-
tion, they show whether property is at stake in a given situation in a non-
arbitrary, normative way. More specifically, by identifying a set of inter-
ests that are typically regarded as being property in a particular context or
circumstance, Merrill's patterning definitions closely track realistic expec-
tations about property.2°'
1. Regulatory Takings Property
All of Merrill's patterning definitions require some degree of exclu-
sive use and control, but for regulatory takings claims there must also be
an irrevocable right to discrete, marketable assets.202 This dichotomy is
justified for several reasons. First, the distinction between takings property
and due process property reflects the textual differences of the clauses.
Unlike the Due Process Clauses, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
197. Penner, supra note 149, at 805-807, 817; see Arnold, supra note 24, at 292 ("American law
recognizes property interests in business goodwill, but not friendship; in love songs, but not love; in
celebrity identity, but not personality; and in expressions of ideas, but not ideas themselves. Thus,
defining property rights, even in intangibles, requires attention to the interplay between the human
relationships involved and the object of those relationships.") (footnotes omitted).
198. See Merrill, supra note 30, at 953.
199. See infra Subpart III.B. 1
200. See infra Subpart III.B.2.
201. Merrill, supra note 30, at 979; see Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modem
Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1529, 1531, 1551 (1989) (emphasizing the need and forecasting a
move to consider the specific context in analyzing the nature of interests in land use and other forms of
property); id. at 1545 (concluding that "water rights are context dependent rather than abstract").
202. Merrill, supra note 30, at 969, 974.
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ment applies only to "private property. " " Also, it refers specifically to
things that are "taken" as opposed to merely "deprived. "214 The contrast
between those two terms supports the conclusion that the Takings Clause
is more limited than the Due Process Clauses:
To take property connotes to seize, expropriate, or confiscate
some thing, that is, a discrete asset. To deprive someone of prop-
erty has a broader range of meanings; especially when coupled
with the ideas of depriving someone of life or liberty, to deprive
someone of property is either to dispossess them or to remove
something of material value from them.2°5
Further justification can be found in the divergent historical underpin-
nings of the Takings and Due Process Clauses. The Takings Clause is
firmly rooted in a concern for condemnation of conventional interests in
land.2° It was motivated in part by the proclivities of military units to re-
quisition supplies without compensation during the Revolutionary War.2 °7
Anxieties about expropriations of colonial property belonging to British
loyalists and nullification of British land grants also played some role.208
All of the paradigmatic takings cases involved discrete assets.2°9 In con-
trast, the Due Process Clause was intended to safeguard life, liberty, and
property against the usual types of state-sanctioned punishment: execu-
tions, imprisonment, and fines and forfeitures. 210 Its scope was meant to be
far broader than the physical confiscation of specific, discrete assets.2
Adopting a narrow definition of property for purposes of regulatory
takings claims makes good sense from a functional perspective as well
because the invocation of the Takings Clause has by far the most signifi-
cant consequences:
212
[Tihe Takings Clause, with its per se rules, its lack of a tradition
of deference to local authorities and agencies, and its waiver of
state sovereign immunity against claims for money damages, is
203. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with id. amend. XIV.
204. Id. amend. V.
205. Merrill, supra note 30, at 983-84 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
206. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 785-91 (1995) (describing early colonial practices related
to physical confiscation of land and other things). We make no attempt to define eminent domain
property in this Article, but surmise that it may be more inclusive than the definition of regulatory
takings property. See infra Subpart III.B. 1.
207. Merrill, supra note 30, at 984.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 984-85.
212. Id. at 985.
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strong medicine, best channeled into fairly narrow paths of gov-
ernment liability .... It is often enforced through categorical or
per se rules-most prominently the rules making any permanent
physical invasion a taking and requiring the payment of compensa-
tion for any regulation that deprives an owner of all economically
viable use of property. Even the orthodox 'ad hoc' balancing test
for determining when property is taken is applied by the Supreme
Court with little or no deference to the decisions of local officials
or regulators.2"3
In contrast, the relatively lenient consequences associated with viola-
tions of due process, such as remanding a case for pre-deprivation hear-
ings, justifies broader coverage.214 Quite simply, the costs of judicial re-
view are likely to be lower.2 5
Merrill's patterning definition for takings property specifies three ele-
ments. It requires that non-constitutional sources of law confer (1) an irre-
vocable right (2) to exclude others (3) from discrete assets.216 Merrill's test
is nested, meaning that if all three elements are present, then the interest
in question is a property right not only for takings analysis but also for due
process and other purposes.2 7 Conversely, if one or more elements are
lacking, the interest might still be considered property for purposes of due
process or other types of claims but not for regulatory takings purposes.218
Each of Merrill's elements warrants further discussion. First, the uni-
versal feature of constitutional property is exclusivity. 29 Exclusivity is
undoubtedly a key feature of a common law property right; some have
argued that it is in fact the key feature of property. 2 1 "Give someone the
right to exclude others from a valued resource .. . and you give them
property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have proper-
ty.,221 The conclusion that exclusivity is an invariant characteristic of pri-
vate property has been embraced independently over and over again.222
213. Id. at 985, 981 (footnotes omitted).
214. Id. at 985.
215. Id. at 985.
216. Id. at 969.
217. See id. at 983.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 970.
220. See Penner, supra note 149, at 742-43, 766 (arguing that all incidents of property can
summed up in the right of exclusive use); see also Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 61 (1999)
(finding that property includes the "power to channel" a resource); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 384 (1994) (requiring public access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, "one
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights" (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 176 (1979))); Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) ("Property depends upon exclusion by law from interference.").
221. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 730 (1998).
222. Merrill, supra note 30, at 971; see, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71
(1997); Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357, 374 (1954) (suggest-
2008]
Alabama Law Review
Viewing exclusivity as the hallmark of property makes sense for at
least three reasons. Exclusivity makes it relatively easy to identify with
whom one must deal to accomplish the exchange of a thing, which lowers
transaction costs and allows resources to move to uses with higher social
and economic value.223 The right to exclusive possession, even in non-use,
also protects subjective values associated with things such as homes and
cherished personal property, which fosters the development of personality,
self-actualization and, in turn, community stability.224 Recognizing exclu-
sive possession and use rights also diffuses societal power and helps safe-
guard individual liberty.225
Exclusivity means the power to possess an item (physically or virtual-
ly) without undue interference from others and to direct whether and how
the item will be used and who may use it.226 This is evidenced by the types
of interests commonly regarded as property, such as easements, profits,
and real covenants, all of which include the right to exclude others from
physically interfering with a particular land use.227 Likewise, one who
holds an intellectual property right has a right to exclude others from the
use of ideas and images, while mortgagees and lien-holders hold rights to
exclude others from impairing their security interests.228
There may be degrees of exclusivity that warrant treatment as property
in some circumstances but not in others. A license, for example, is merely
a "permission slip" from someone who holds the right to exclude but
agrees to allow another to gain access.229 Culturally significant artwork
and other forms of cultural property provide another example where one
who possesses the artwork has relatively limited rights to exclusive pos-
session and disposition.230
Elements specific to the patterning definition for a regulatory takings
claim are irrevocability and the discrete asset requirement.23' Irrevocability
does not mean that the interest never expires. Instead, there must be a
strong degree of security of expectation:
For takings purposes . ..property must be "vested" in roughly
the same sense that a common-law property right is vested and a
mere license is not. Basically, takings property must be irrevoca-
ing that the right to exclude the world from the thing we call property captures the central features of
common-law property that make it such a valuable social institution).
223. See Merrill, supra note 30, at 972-73.
224. See id. at 973.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 971-72.
227. Id. at 972.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 976.
230. See infra Subpart IV.C (assessing individual and communal interests in art).
231. See Merrill, supra note 30, at 969.
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ble for a predetermined period of time, and there must be no un-
derstanding, explicit or implicit, that the legislature has reserved
the right to terminate the interest before this period of time
elapses.232
Merrill concedes that efforts to distinguish between vested, irrevocable
rights and mere privileges or licenses are "prone to circularity."233 For
purposes of the patterning definition, interests in property entail a high
level of security against legal change and be durable and irrevocable for a
set time period.234 Irrevocability also implies rights to devise or convey the
thing to others. Federally issued grazing permits, for example, are mere
licenses that cannot be freely conveyed and that are revocable during the
permit period for noncompliance and for various other reasons. 235 As
such, there is no takings property, 236 but licenses can constitute due
process property.237
Finally, the takings claimant must show that a discrete asset is at
stake. This requirement hones in on the thing governed by the owner's
right to exclude.238 It must be a valuable resource identifiable as something
that is owned, as opposed to being inherently personal, inherently public,
or just plain old "stuff. "239 It entails a distinct tangible or intangible thing
that exists in a legally recognized property form, such as a lease, an ease-
ment, a trademark, or a bank account.24 In addition, it must be something
that is exchanged by economic actors with enough regularity and frequen-
cy to be recognized as a distinct asset.24 ' Thus, the essential incident of
transferability is reflected in this component of Merrill's patterning defini-
tion.
232. Id. at 978.
233. Id. at 962.
234. Id. at 969, 978.
235. See Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 586-87 (2002)
236. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1973); Klump v. United States, 30 F. App'x
958, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 167-70 (1996). Grazing permits
lack other key incidents of property as well. For example, permittees have no right to exclude others
from the federal grazing allotment. See Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1983).
237. See, e.g., Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that a fish-
ing permit bestowed a revocable license, not a Fifth Amendment property right); Klump, 30 F. App'x
at 962 (holding that a grazing permit is not a compensable property right).
238. See supra Subpart I.A. (describing need to focus property inquiries on the thing in question).
239. See Merrill, supra note 30, at 975.
240. See id. at 974. In contrast, an incident of ownership, such as a right to inherit, is not itself
"discrete property" but rather a right incident to discrete property. Id. at 974-75.
241. Id. at 974; see id. at 975-76 ("In most cases involving takings property, it will be obvious that
there is both a readily identifiable discrete resource (the land, the chattel, the bank account) and a right
to exclude with respect to that resource (conferred by ownership of a fee simple, a lease or an ease-
ment).").
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2. Procedural Due Process Property
Procedural due process requires that, prior to an action affecting an in-
terest in property, notice must be given which is "reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. "242
Courts have interpreted due process property extraordinarily broadly,
stretching the concept of property well beyond ownership of land and chat-
tels to encompass public employment,243 education, 2" and various kinds of
licenses.245 For due process purposes, property appears to encompass just
about every kind of legally sanctioned entitlement. 2'
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court found that due process re-
quires states to follow extensive hearing procedures before terminating
welfare benefits.247 It retrenched somewhat in Board of Regents v. Roth,
where it took pains to explain that due process is required only for those
entitlements with discernible boundaries.248 There, it held that an assistant
professor without tenure did not have a property right sufficient to require
university authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew
his contract of employment, where the contract specified only a one-year
term and lacked any provision for renewal.249
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is
a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already
acquired in specific benefits .... To have a property interest in a
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
250
According to the Court, a "legitimate claim of entitlement" involves
only those benefits or things that people rely on in their daily lives.25'
Subsequently, the Court clarified its due process test by emphasizing
the element of exclusivity. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, it held that a statutory cause of
242. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
243. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972).
244. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975).
245. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (professional licenses); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (drivers' licenses).
246. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 61, at 583 n.273. But see Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 764-66 (2005) (no due process rights to police protection).
247. 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
248. See Merrill, supra note 30, at 919 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)).
249. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
250. Id. at 576-77.
251. Id. at 577.
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action for false advertising does not implicate due process property be-
cause the purported right, which rested on the ability to compete for future
customers, did not encompass a right to exclude others. 2 In contrast,
business assets, including goodwill, are considered property for due
process purposes because one has a right to exclude others from business
goodwill by calling upon state authorities to protect the proprietor from
253extortion.
Thus, the patterning definition of property for procedural due process
purposes requires that a claimant possess "an entitlement having a mone-
tary value that can be terminated only upon a finding that some specific
condition has been satisfied."2' This definition requires the claimant to
have a recognizable legal right (perhaps something less than an irrevocable
right) to exclude others from interfering with a property (small "p") inter-
est of some sort. In this context, property means something of enduring
value, exclusive or unique to the claimant. Unlike property for takings
purposes, however, the due process patterning definition does not require
a discrete; marketable asset.
3. Common Law Property
The concept of property under the common law is extremely broad.
For purposes of property-based common law claims, at least one court has
accepted a definition of property that "include[s] every species of estate,
real and personal, and everything which one person can own and transfer
to another. , 255 In effect, then, under this definition common law property
"extends to every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed.
upon which it is practicable to place a money value. "256
More specifically, the property-based common law claim of conver-
sion entails the unauthorized, "intentional exercise of dominion or con-
trol" over a thing in a manner that "seriously interferes with right of
another to control it." 257 A conversion, in effect, repudiates the owner's
right in a thing by denying or acting inconsistently with the owner's pos-
252. 527 U.S. 666, 672-74 (1999).
253. See id. at 675. College Savings Bank involved a substantive due process claim. Id. at 672-74.
To protect against irrational or retroactive economic legislation or damages, Merrill's patterning
definition for substantive due process reaches the broadest range of interests, i.e., "everything relevant
to calculating a person's material wealth or net worth." Merrill, supra note 30, at 982.
254. Merrill, supra note 30, at 961 (emphasis omitted).
255. Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128, 129 (Cal. 1929) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also In re Albion Disposal, Inc., 152 B.R. 794, 807 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1993) ("Any right that is not unlawful or against public policy, which has acquired a pecuniary value,
becomes a property right entitled to protection.").
256. Yuba River Power Co., 279 P. at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965); see 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 1
(2004).
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sessory interests.25 Common elements of conversion are "(1) the plain-
tiff's ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the
conversion; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposi-
tion of property rights; and (3) damages. "259
There is little distinction between common law trespass, which also
involves an offense against another's legally protected possessory rights,
and conversion, which is an exercise of "hostile dominion [beyond] mere
interference," over the thing in question. 21 "[A]ny interference with the
[owner's possession or access to thing could be considered] an exercise of
'dominion,' [making] the difference between [trespass and conversion] a
matter of degree. "261
The relevant question for our purposes is whether the purported owner
has a "legally protected interest" for purposes of a common law claim. In
this context, the phrase legally protected interest means the existence of a
possessory interest in a tangible or intangible thing protected by law from
destruction. 262 Conversion or trespass claims can be asserted for interfe-
rence with personal property263 and fixtures 2 4 or natural resources severed
from the real estate.265 Other tangible things subject to conversion or tres-
pass claims include timber, 266 gravel, 267 minerals, 268 and water.269 Money
can be the subject of conversion only when it can be identified by distinct
marking or segregated.27 ° Conversion claims can apply to intangible things
as well, so long as the things in question are "specific and identifiable. "27
Examples of intangible things found to be property for conversion purpos-
es include computer programs, 272 licenses to do business,273 business
names,274 and Internet domain names.275
258. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 1.
259. 90 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Proof of Landlord's Conversion of Tenant's Personal Prop-
erty § 3 (2006) (delineating elements for proof of a landlord's conversion of a tenant's personal prop-
erty).
260. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A cmt. a; see also 75 AM. JUrR. 2D Trespass §
12 (2007) ("The important distinction between trespass to chattels and conversion lies in the measure
of damages; in trespass, the plaintiff may recover for the diminished value of the chattel or one's
interest in its possession and use, while in conversion, the measure of damages is the full value of the
chattel, at the time and place of the tort. ").
261. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A cmt. a.
262. See id. § 927 cmt. a (1979).
263. See, e.g., Peiser v. Mettler, 328 P.2d 953, 959 (Cal. 1958).
264. See, e.g., Pick v. Fordyce Co-op Credit Ass'n, 408 N.W.2d 248, 255 (Neb. 1987).
265. See, e.g., Collins v. Intervest, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
266. See, e.g., Dollar v. McKinney, 103 So. 2d 785, 787 (Ala. 1958).
267. See generally R.W. Gascoyne, Annotation, Earth, Sand, or Gravel as Subject of Conversion,
84 A.L.R. 2D 790 (1962).
268. See, e.g., Saddle Mountain Minerals, L.L.C. v. Joshi, 95 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Wash. 2004).
269. See, e.g., Stites v. Duit Constr. Co., 992 P.2d 913, 914 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999).
270. See, e.g., Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp., 804 A.2d 180, 199 (Conn. 2002); Key
Bank of N.Y. v. Grossi, 642 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
271. See Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 765, 769-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
272. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 7 (2004).
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Because a possessory interest in a thing is sufficient to maintain an ac-
tion for conversion, when the right in question consists solely of a right to
use a thing, as is the case with water, the requisite legal interest to bring a
conversion claim against the interfering party should generally be found.276
This is true even if the possessors do not have full legal title; so long as
they lawfully exercise possession or control of the thing in question, their
rights are sufficient for purposes of conversion.277 Some courts have
couched the action as a type of "quiet title" claim to personal property
rather than conversion, but the effect appears to be the same.278
C. The Power of Metaphor: Trading the Bundle for a Web
For all its flaws, "the [bundle of rights] metaphor. . . unquestionably
reigns supreme as [the] symbol . . . of property. "279 It has been employed
by countless law professors to illustrate the nature of present and future
interests in real property to first year students.28° With Merrill's patterning
definitions at hand, however, is there any need for metaphor? If the pat-
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. In contrast, interests in educational degrees are generally not considered property for
purposes of distribution upon dissolution of marriage. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d
75, 77 (Colo. 1977) ("An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even by
the broad views of the concept of 'property.'); Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 850-52 (Ky. 1982)
(agreeing that degrees are not marital property and citing multiple supporting cases); Petersen v.
Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 241-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("We agree with... Graham that an advanced
degree .. .confers an intangible right [that] cannot .. .be characterized as property subject to
[spousal] division.").
276. See infra Subpart V.C (arguing that a conversion claim should exist for an aggrieved water
right holder).
277. See 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 5 (2004); see also, e.g., Ex parte Anderson, 867 So.2d
1125, 1131-32 (Ala. 2003) (concluding that the possessory interest of a car owner's daughter and her
husband was sufficient to maintain an action for conversion against a couple that had sold the car
without permission, even though the daughter and her husband did not legally own the car); Madera
Irrigation Dist. v. All Persons, 306 P.2d 886, 893 (Cal. 1957) (noting "that the members of an irriga-
tion district are the beneficial owners of the water rights of the district[, which are held in trust by the
district for its members, and thus] can demand [the] services to which they are entitled," i.e., water
delivery).
278. See, e.g., Yuba River Power Co. v. Nev. Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128, 128, 131 (Cal. 1929).
The Yuba River court held that a person who has complied with the state Water Commission Act,
'entitling [him] to receive preferential right to appropriate certain amounts of water[, may] bring an
action in equity in the nature of a suit to quiet title [to property] to determine the adverse claims to...
the water" brought by an upstream claimant. Id. It explained that, under the California Civil Code,
[tihe t rm 'property' is sufficiently comprehensive to include every species of estate, real
and personal, and everything which one person can own and transfer to another. It extends
to every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is
practicable to place a money value.
Id. at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted).
279. See Duncan, supra note 75, at 774. For theories on the origins of the metaphor, see WILLIAM
M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 186, n.81 (1998), and Penner, supra
note 149, at 712-13.
280. See Madhavi Sunder, IPF, 59 STAN. L. REv. 257, 317 (2006).
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terning definitions fully serve the needs of property law as a distinct legal
institution, embodying specific rules and definitions "designed to create
and protect the value inherent in stable ownership of assets,"281 arguably, a
property metaphor serves no useful purpose. Merrill's approach not only
provides clear guideposts for defining property, it also demonstrates that
whether an interest in a thing is considered property can vary depending
on context, without defeating rule of law objectives. But an appropriate
metaphor can assist in evaluating the contextual backdrop of a property or
property-like dispute. A metaphor that describes human relationships with
a thing considered property, assisted by Merrill's patterning definitions,
can be a powerful heuristic.
Legal positivists and realists express disdain for the use of metaphor,
viewing it as a crude layperson's device rather than a sophisticated analyt-
ical tool. Jeremy Bentham provided the most graphic description of meta-
phor: a "'pestilence' . . . a 'syphilis, which . . . carries into every part of
the system the principle of rottenness. '282 Lon Fuller argued that such
analytical crutches should be used cautiously with full knowledge of their
incompleteness, like "servants to be discharged as soon as they have ful-
filled their functions."283 Those who do find a place for metaphor relegate
it to the lowly spot of a "temporary place-holder for more fully developed
lines of argument. "2' Justice Cardozo, for example, warned that
"[mietaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. "285
It is certainly true that, "[ojnce [established,] metaphors become tena-
cious carriers of legal meaning,"286 possibly allowing advocates to use
them to obfuscate meaning and to manipulate rather than enlighten
thought. Could it be, though, that the references to venereal disease and
servitude indicate that the legal scholars' hostility to the use of metaphor is
an expression of elitism and disdain for "lower" classes rather than a prin-
cipled analytical critique?287 Among "those who view law as a close rela-
tive of ordinary language, [the use of] metaphor is [commonly accepted
as] a basic building block of . . .understanding" and problem-solving.288
As such, the use of metaphor can strengthen prevailing rules and classifi-
281. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 58, at 615.
282. Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 186
(2004) (quoting 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, WoRKs at 235, V, at 92 (1843)).
283. See LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 121 (1967).
284. See Tsai, supra note 282, at 186.
285. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
286. Tsai, supra note 282, at 189.
287. See Eduardo M. Pefalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the
Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2971, 2971 (2006).
288. See Tsai, supra note 282, at 182.
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cations by infusing them with common experience through visual and often
emotive terms.289
At a basic level, ... metaphors allow human beings to understand
one phenomenon in relationship to another and to illuminate some
salient details while shading others. In doing so, they order our
social world by weaving new events into stock scenes and every-
day occurrences.
[They] trigger[] powerful, recurring frameworks of meaning and
patterns of belief, and. .. set[] in motion deeply rooted folk im-
ages, archetypes, and story lines. 9°
Metaphor can serve as a powerful decision-making heuristic to
ground-truth hypotheses about the application of existing rules to new or
previously unexplored domains.29' As such, the use of metaphor in legal
reasoning is more likely to stimulate rather than constrain deliberation.2"
Just as importantly, metaphor nurtures a sense of community and promotes
the rule of law "by linking lawyer to layman and ruling institution to citi-
zen. "293
Judges seem to find the use of metaphor irresistible, for good reason.
Metaphor is a means of reaching the litigants, the advocates, and the
broader public: "Metaphor is at once the first step in a complicated dance
over institutional prerogative and legal meaning, the symbolic union of
communitas and the democratic spirit, and the embodiment of our inner-
most hopes and fears as members of the American polity. 29
More specifically, imagery and metaphor are important tools in prop-
erty law. 95
289. See id. at 189-90.
290. Id. at 188-89.
291. See Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The Evolution of
Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 265, 266 (2002) ("[M]etaphors
wield enormous power over thought and behavior. Some psychology and linguistic scholars have even
asserted that all knowledge and understanding is metaphorical in nature.").
292. See Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1872, 1876 (1990); see also
STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE AND MIND 21, 43-68 (2001) (describing
"the irreducibly imaginative nature of reason," often expressed through metaphor); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutions as "Living Trees"? Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive Metaphors, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 921, 958 (2006) (noting the centrality of metaphor in constitutional legal analysis).
293. See Tsai, supra note 282, at 189.
294. Id. at 239.
295. See Arnold, supra note 24, at 341-42.
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A metaphor captures the imagination far more than a grand
theory. With its power to energize the imagination, a new meta-
phor effectively challenges old ideas and stimulates new ones....
Thus, the metaphor, even in its simplicity, is not intended to be a
"scary simplifier" but instead a linguistic and visual tool to aid in
thinking about the thingness of property.2 6
The bundle of rights metaphor, however, has outlived its usefulness.2"
Not only does it, in our opinion, fail to serve as a well-calibrated mechan-
ism to describe property rights in personal property and intangibles, it
does even less to identify or describe interests in things that occupy the
margins of property law, such as water rights."'8 True, viewing property
as a "bundle of rights" can be useful in conceptualizing the sum total of
rights one can have with respect to a parcel of land.299 The symbol makes
it easier to understand the concept of present and future estates, such as
life estates and reversions, in relation to the bundle, that is, the fee simple
absolute. 3" But it obfuscates the identification and distinct attributes of the
specific thing over which ownership interests are asserted, °1 and makes us
think only superficially about the myriad ways people relate to things,
concentrating only on rights and not on responsibilities to other related
interests and to the thing itself.3 2 It is misleading and potentially destruc-
tive to employ a metaphor that views property as a one-dimensional, life-
less bundle.
In spite of its shortcomings, it would take much to dislodge the bundle
metaphor from Supreme Court jurisprudence which consistently invokes
it, particularly in takings cases. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil,3"3 Justice Scalia drew upon "the 'bundle of rights"' acquired when a
landowner takes title in finding that a restriction on coastal development
effectuated a taking. °4 The Court engaged in its most creative use of the
metaphor in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,305 where it concluded that prospec-
tive legislation could not redefine the property rights of landowners so as
296. Id. (quoting Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 21, 41
(1996)).
297. See Duncan, supra note 75, at 789.
298. See id. at 784-86
299. See id. at 774.
300. See id. at 775.
301. See id. at 803-04.
302. Id. at 804.
303. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (characte-
rizing the "right to exclude others [a]s 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights'" (inter-
nal citation omitted)); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (concluding that impairment of
one distinct strand in the bundle of rights is not a taking).
304. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
305. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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to preclude a takings challenge because "[t]he State may not put so potent
a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle. ""
The only hope of displacing the bundle metaphor is to construct a
compelling replacement with high symbolic appeal. Some have suggested
reforming the bundle by inserting "green wood" into it" or tying the
bundle with "the cord [of] public interest."3 °8 Neither approach goes far
enough and both lack an essential component-the thing that is the subject
of a property interest.
We agree with Tony Arnold that a web of interests is a more appro-
priate metaphor for property.3" The web emphasizes the interrelatedness
of things and people, and unlike the bundle, places the thing in question
smack dab in the middle of the inquiry. 1 ' Placing the thing at the center is
not meant to indicate that it is necessarily the most important part of the
web; instead, it shows that all interest-holders have the thing in com-
mon.3"' Professor Arnold explains:
Its centrality is one of commonality and context, not hierarchy and
preoccupation. Seeing property as a web of interests can and
should mean seeing the political, social, economic, and ethical as-
pects of property law, and the new metaphor should not be used to
hide these aspects behind attention to an "objective" thing of own-
ership.
306. See id. at 627. The Court explained that
Ulust as a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value of
land without effecting a taking because it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned,
other enactments are unreasonable and do not become less so through passage of time or
title. Were we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve
the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme
or unreasonable.
Id.
The Palazzolo Court ultimately concluded that a Lucas-type claim of "per se taking" for a deprivation
of all economic use was precluded by the undisputed value of the unregulated portion of the tract of
land at issue. See id. at 630-32.
307. See Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics
and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AEF. L. REv. 347, 403 (1998).
308. See Duncan, supra note 71, at 804.
309. See Arnold, supra note 22, at 340-342. Eric Freyfogle has used a web metaphor for property
as well. See Freyfogle, supra note 201, at 1547.
310. See Arnold, supra note 22, at 340.
311. See id.
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[A]n understanding of property as a web of interests embraces the
complexity, ambiguity, and constantly evolving nature of property
law.
312
The web metaphor is a more effective vehicle for infusing property
rights with environmental and communal considerations while reflecting
the complex interrelationships between people, society, and things than is
an imagined collection of rights or sticks bound together in a wooden bun-
dle.
Using a web as our metaphor for property has the added virtue of be-
ing a design "innovation inspired by nature. "313 The inherent physical cha-
racteristics of a web help illustrate the attributes of property. Spider webs
are natural marvels. The remarkable attributes of spider silk make it "the
'Holy Grail' of biomaterials. "314 The qualities of a web are quite similar to
humans' expectations about property: webs do not dry out or decay, and,
like property, if sheltered, they can out-last their creators.315 Some of the
threads within the web are silky smooth while others are sticky, 316 just as
some aspects of property are crystal clear while others are muddy or visc-
ous.317 Despite being extremely fine, filaments in a spider web are three
times stronger than steel of the same diameter,3"' but at the same time,
elastic enough to stretch up to forty percent of their length before break-
ing.319 Similarly, people may create intangible but powerful emotional
bonds with certain forms of property.3 2°
312. Id. at 340-42.
313. Kennedy, supra note 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). The use of nature as inspiration
for design innovations is known as biomimetics or biomimicry. See id. A well-known example of
applied biomimicry is the Wright brothers' use of bird wings in airplane design. See id. Nature as a
design principle is currently used to explore a variety of innovations, including the development of
various biomaterials (some utilizing principles learned from spider silk) and Nike products alike. See
id.
314. See id.
315. See Bill Amos, The Spiders Web Part I, MICROSCOPY-UK.ORG.UK, http://www.microscopy-
uk.org.uk/mag/indexmag.html?http://www.microscopy-uk.org.uk/mag/artnov98/baspid3.htm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2008).
316. See id.
317. See generally Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577
(1988).
318. See Kennedy, supra note 26.
319. See Wikipedia.org, Spider Silk, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spider-silk (last visited Feb. 2,
2008).
320. Just as humans use property for a variety of purposes, spiders use their their webs for a
variety of purposes-for homes, to protect their offspring, to capture and consume other creatures, and
to travel. See id. Humans have used spider silk for a variety of purposes, too. It was used by the
ancient Greeks to dress wounds. See Audio tape: John H. Lienhard,_Engines of our Ingenuity No.
1069: A Spider's Web (available at http://www.uh.edu/engines/epil069.htn). Later, it was used and
by indigenous people of the Pacific Rim and Asia for ornamentation, rain gear, and fishing lines. See
Amos, supra note 315. Before synthetic fibers were invented, spider silk was indispensable for center-
ing cross hairs in telescopes and gun sights and for measuring reticles in optical instruments. See
Audio tape: John H. Lienhard, Engines of our Ingenuity No. 1069: A Spider's Web, supra.
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Though no two webs are exactly alike, a few fundamental elements
must be present for their formation. Each web consists of a firm webframe
around a central hub of silk.321 A structurally sound web must have both a
dragline, to transport the spider and tie the web to a stable structural base,
and a webframe to support and give form to the filaments.322 Requirements
at an even more basic level exist for these construction cornerstones-
special protein-rich fibers.3 23 The amino acids in the web-protein have a
specific sequence and content that make the web-protein strong.324 Just as
webs must be composed of certain elemental building blocks, so too must
interests in property be composed of certain key ingredients to be recog-
nized as full property rights under the law (takings property)-durable
interests in both the exclusive possession of and use of a discrete marketa-
ble asset.
325
On a less tangible, yet perhaps more visceral level of examination, the
web as a symbol stands for something more than what is seen or touched.
Like human cognition and decision-making, and like relationships to a
thing subject to property law, webs are more than just a collection of con-
centric and linear strands; each is composed of multiple nodes, or points
of interaction, and multiple feedback loops. 3 26 Ecologically speaking, the
nodes of a web serve as points of intersection or interaction, while the web
connectors serve as pathways for positive or negative feedbacks.327 In cog-
nitive psychology, nodes and feedback loops, or pathways, form the se-
mantic networks so fundamental to drawing analogies between familiar
experiences and newly encountered things and experiences and drawing
rational conclusions.3 28 For the property web, these nodes and feedback
loops extend to, from, and between interested persons, the community,
and the thing.
321. See Roxanna Watts, My Garden Spider, OUTSIDE IN ONLINE, May 2005,
http://www.mdc.mo.gov/kids/out-in/2005/05/l.htm.
322. See generally Brent D. Opell, Functional Similarities of Spider Webs with Diverse Architec-
tures, 148 AM. NATURALIST 630 (1996), available at http://simurl.com/vvv-ee-JJ.
323. See E-mail from Dr. Marcy Osgood, Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico School
of Medicine, to Sandra Zellmer, Professor and Hevelone Research Chair, University of Nebraska
College of Law (Nov. 10, 2007, 10:03) (on file with the Alabama Law Review). The main ingredients
of silk fibers are proteins, and particular amino acids (cysteine and tyrosine, as well as glycine, alanine
and proline) lend their specific and interacting properties to enable the silk fibroin protein to carry out
its function perfectly. See id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 26.
324. See Kennedy, supra note 26. See generally J. M. Gosline et al., The Mechanical Design of
Spider Silks: From Fibroin Sequence to Mechanical Function, 202 J. EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY 3295
(1999), available at http://jeb.biologists.org/cgi/reprint/202/23/3295.pdf.
325. See supra Subpart III.B. 1.
326. E-mail from Dr. Marcy Osgood, supra note 323.
327. See id.
328. See ASHCRAFr, supra note 43, at 261; see id. at 335 (describing the role of "scripts," or
"large-scale semantic and episodic knowledge structures that guide our interpretation and comprehen-
sion," in memory, activation, insight, and generalized understanding).
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Scientists use the "web of life" as a metaphor for the interdependence
of physical, psychological, and cultural phenomena. 29 This concept has
challenged conventional views of evolution and the organization of living
systems.33° E.O. Wilson, perhaps more than any other, sparked the pub-
lic's interest in biodiversity and the interconnectedness of life by empha-
sizing our "innate tendency to affiliate with, and draw deep satisfaction
from, other organisms.""'
Using the web as a metaphor for property illustrates that land, natural
resources, and people are part of an interdependent system.332 The owner's
relationship with the thing forms a concentric circle, closest to the center
of the web. Interests held by others, such as easements, liens, and future
interests, and by the public, such as rights to water navigation and
recreation, as well as use of fisheries, comprise other concentric circles in
the web. For land and natural resources, ecological interests find a place
in these circles as well. Societal norms, such as the public trust doctrine,"'
form the outermost webframe, surrounding both the human relationships
and the thing itself.
Linear strands, representing the elemental incidents of property as cla-
rified by Merrill's patterning definitions, 34 radiate in spokes from the cen-
ter to the webframe. The strongest strand-the dragline of the web-
reflects reasonable expectations to exclusive possession, use, and control
of the thing, which in turn represents the very essence of property owner-
ship.335 If the dragline is removed or compromised, the web itself col-
lapses and there is no property. This strand, like the other two necessary
incidents of takings property-an irrevocable interest in a discrete asset-is
moored in background principles of law.336 For example, in a prior appro-
priation state, statutes, case decisions, beneficial use requirements, and
329. See FRITJOF CAPRA, THE WEB OF LIFE 34-35 (1996); see also EDWARD 0. WILSON,
CONSILIENCE 4 (1998) (bringing together various branches of knowledge to encourage scholars to
bridge the gap between science and the arts by recognizing a common goal: to give us "a conviction.
. . that the world is orderly and can be explained by a small number of natural laws"); EDWARD 0.
WILSON, THE DIvERsITY OF LIFE 297-335 (1999) (emphasizing the need to familiarize ourselves with
the complexity of the Earth's organisms and ecosystems).
330. See CAPRA, supra note 321, at 35.
331. See Fred Branfman, Living in Shimmering Disequilibrium, SALON.COM, Apr. 22, 2000,
http://archive.salon.com/peoplefeature/2000/04/22/eowilson/print.html. Wilson asserts that con-
sciousness is evolved both from material things and from the sacred, spirituality in each other and in
the natural environment: "[T]o make sacred[] is . . . the end product of evolution . . . . It proceeds
from mere preference and liking, to custom, to ritualization, to law .... ." Id.
332. See Arnold, supra note 22, at 318-19.
333. See generally Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes
the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 195 (1980).
334. See Merrill, supra note 30, at 885, 952-60, 970-81.
335. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Propeny §§ 1, 27 (1997).
336. See supra Subpart 11I.B. 1 (identifying and defining the three elements of takings property).
[Vol. 59:3:679
2008] Unbundling Property in Water 723
transfer restrictions, all help define and situate the water right within the
web.
337
inblRig e~ssWatereu
Figure 1. Web Representation of Bundled Water Rights
Just as the web's purpose is ultimately utilitarian, the metaphor must
also be utilitarian as well as user-friendly. We have become used to look-
ing at property bound in a bundle, tied exclusively to an owner or group
of owners, where each stick or incident of property is easily separated
from the rest.338 The web shifts our focus from the owner and the incidents
of property held by the owner to the thing and the relationships between
337. See Freyfogle, supra note 195, at 1540, 1545 (describing water rights as a "finely drawn
puzzle of interconnected rights" situated in a "complex web of mutual dependencies"); see also Eric.
T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 506-06, 511.
338. See Gray, supra note 159, at 69.
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owners and others and the thing. Ultimately, it is the thing that connects
the owner and others, so the inclusion of actors or interests on the web is
not indiscriminate. The individual owner is not ignored, just viewed in a
broader context. Looking at property in this way, we are less concerned
with which "sticks" from the bundle one actor can detach and wield
against another than with identifying and making sense of connections
between the actors and the thing that is subject to ownership.
The web vividly portrays the key attributes of property, helping us vi-
sualize and analyze the essential questions: Are all three requisite incidents
of property present? What are the background norms and principles that
moor the incidents of property? Perhaps most importantly, the web forces
us to consider the nature of the thing itself, situated within the context of
the particular property dispute.339 Using water as an example, the web
helps discern whether the specific interest in the specific body of water is
a full property interest for purposes of a takings claim in the event of gov-
ernment regulatory curtailment or instead some other type of interest.
IV. PROPERTY, QUASI-PROPERTY, OR SOMETHING ELSE ENTIRELY
All sorts of things, tangible and intangible, have proven difficult to
classify as property or non-property. Humans and their body parts34 ° (in-
cluding sperm34 and embryos342) top the list, but pets, 343 art,34 4 virtual real
estate, 34 1 information, 346 cultural objects,34' air, 34' and, of course, water3 49
all pose challenges to the conventional concept of property. As new crea-
tions are invented and new situations encountered, this list of marginal
cases-cases on the outer boundaries of property norms-will continue to
339. See Arnold, supra note 22, at 318, 320 ("Property rules with respect to land and natural
resources must reflect the interconnectedness and interdependence of the natural world, including all
forms of life .... [P]roperty law must affirm and enforce ... [a] relationship of temporary steward-
ship: a relationship of trust, commitment, and responsibility with an awareness that future generations
will take our place. Humans are part of the ecological community, and therefore have duties to nature
or duties to the land-a land ethic, as Aldo Leopold described it-that can and should be an integral
part of property concepts.").
340. See infra Subpart VI.B.
341. See infra notes 365-371.
342. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 426-26 (E.D. Va. 1989).
343. See Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases: Recognizing Pets' Anth-
ropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31 (2001).
344. See infra Subpart VI.C.
345. See Steven J. Horowitz, Note, Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual Property, 20 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 443 (2007).
346. See infra Subpart VI.A.
347. See Adam Goldberg, Comment, Reaffirming McClain: The National Stolen Property Act and
the Abiding Trade in Looted Cultural Objects, 53 UCLA, L. REV. 1031 (2006); infra Subpart VI. C.
348. See Robert P. Hagan, Comment, Restaurants, Bars, and Workplaces, Lend Me Your Air:
Smokefree Laws as Private Property Exactions-The Undisputed Country for Nollan and Dolan, 22 J.
CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 143 (2005); infra Subpart IV.D.
349. See infra Subpart V.
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grow. Determining whether a property right exists in such cases can tell us
a great deal about property itself.
While making no attempt to conduct a comprehensive survey of mar-
ginal or quasi-property cases, this Part takes a closer look at news, human
bodies, art, and air in an effort to ground-truth the web metaphor and its
patterning definitions, and to find helpful guideposts that may extend to
water and other things. This assessment yields few direct parallels, but it
does demonstrate that the nature of the thing in question is essential to
treatment as property. It also supports the use of different patterning defi-
nitions for different types of claims by revealing that courts have had no
qualms treating unique things as property in some contexts but not others.
A. News
The news was at the center of the first dispute to compel an in-depth
assessment of the nature of property by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press,35 the Court characterized news
as "quasi property," enforceable as property between competitors but not
as between the news collector and the general public.351 The holding
turned on whether the defendant had engaged in unfair competition, but the
Court rationalized its decision to enjoin the competing press company by
invoking the language of property.3 In dicta, it stated that in a court of
common law, something as evanescent as news could not be property yet,
"in a court of equity, [news] has all the attributes of property necessary
for determining that a misappropriation of it by a competitor is unfair
competition. ,
[A]lthough we may and do assume that neither party has any re-
maining property interest as against the public in uncopyrighted
news matter after the moment of its first publication, it by no
means follows that there is no remaining property interest in it as
between themselves. For, to both of them alike, news matter,
however little susceptible of ownership or dominion in the abso-
lute sense, is stock in trade, to be gathered at the cost of enter-
prise, organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed
and sold to those who will pay money for it, as for any other mer-
chandise. . . . [W]e hardly can fail to recognize that for this pur-
pose, and as between them, [the news] must be regarded as quasi
350. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
351. See id. at 236; see also Penner, supra note 145, at 717 n.22 ("To treat this case in terms of
property . . . is to treat the property right, like a copyright, as the exclusive right to publish for value
the news one has oneself gathered, in other words, as a market monopoly.").
352. See Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236-37.
353. See id. at 240.
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property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the pub-
lic. 35
4
Penner criticizes the case for perpetuating the notion "that 'property'
is no[thing but a] legal device that protects the owner's relation to
[any]thing of value by enforcing the exclusion of others[;] . . . as such[,
property law] may.. . be applied to anything whatsoever." 355 Penner says
that the Court, by creating a "mystery substance [known as] 'quasi proper-
ty,' . . . strip[ped] away [one of property's] few generally acknowledged
attributes, [exclusivity] against all the world, not just against specified
individuals. "356
A look at the dispute through the lens of Merrill's patterning defini-
tions indicates that the International News opinion does not necessarily
miss the mark after all. Neither competitor had an irrevocable right to
exclusive use of a discrete asset-current events compiled in news ar-
ticles-for purposes of takings claims, but they each had some expectation
in exclusive use as between competing news distributors.357 Thus, both
competitor's interests would likely rise to the level of due process proper-
ty.
B. Body Parts
Most if not all state legislatures have recognized some limited form of
rights, sometimes characterized as "quasi-property rights," in dead bodies
and the organs and tissues of a decedent so that the decedent's estate or
next-of-kin may control organ donation or other lawful forms of disposi-
tion.358 Likewise, some courts recognize a legitimate claim of entitlement
to possession of a decedent's remains for burial by affording the next-of-
kin procedural due process protection.35 9 The quasi-property concept does
not extend so far as to allow claims for conversion, however, when a body
was mishandled3" or mistakenly cremated by the funeral home, 361 or
354. Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
355. See Penner, supra note 145, at 718.
356. See id. at 717.
357. See Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 238-41.
358. See Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of
Human Research Panicipants' Propeny Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
257, 276 n.80 (2004) ("[AIII the states have enacted legislation that relies upon a quasi-property rights
theory in permitting a decedent to donate his body after death for the purposes of transplantation,
therapy, research, or education. . . . U.S. courts have recognized common law rights in the human
body that are akin to property rights. For example, in certain circumstances a decedent's relatives
possess 'property or quasi-property rights' in the decedent's body for the purpose of controlling the
disposition of the body after death.").
359. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991); Crocker v. Pleasant,
778 So.2d 978, 988 (Fla. 2001).
360. See, e.g., Keyes v. Konkel, 78 N.W. 649, 649 (Mich. 1899).
361. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg. Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 882 (Colo. 1994).
[Vol. 59:3:679
Unbundling Property in Water
where organs or tissues were used by researchers without consent."'
Courts have flatly "reject[ed] the fictional theory that [exclusive or full]
property right[s] exist[- in" bodies or body parts.363 This reasoning is
grounded on the fact that bodies and body parts are not discrete, commer-
cially transferable assets, although they do in fact have tremendous mone-
tary value for biomedical research and organ transplants.
Reproductive material, specifically, gametes and embryos, have prov-
en equally challenging, and courts have reached similar results. In Hecht
v. Superior Court,365 a decedent's girlfriend sued to recover vials of sperm
deposited at a sperm bank.3" The decedent's children wanted the sperm
destroyed, but the girlfriend sought possession of it either as a gift from
the decedent or as an asset of his estate.367 The trial court ultimately ac-
cepted the latter theory, and awarded her a percentage of the sperm.3 68 The
California Court of Appeals agreed that the sperm was quasi-property for
purposes of probate.369 The court reasoned in a previous decision that un-
der the state probate code, the decedent retained decision-making authority
and had a sufficient ownership interest in his sperm at his death to consti-
tute property, defined as "anything that may be the subject of owner-
ship."37 The court cautioned, however, that this interest was merely "de-
cision-making authority" and not "true" property.
371
A movement toward recognizing greater property rights for purposes
of lawful disposition of body parts has gained momentum since Moore v.
Regents of the University of California.372 There, a patient asserted a prop-
erty right in cells from his spleen in an action for conversion against re-
searchers and biotech companies who had established and patented a valu-
able cell line from his tissue.373 The court dismissed the claim,374 citing the
common law principle that "[o]nly property can be converted."3 75 It failed
362. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074-
76 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
363. See Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 882. The court reasoned that the measure of damages for conver-
sion depends on the market value of the converted good, which, in a corpse, is unascertainable. See id.
at 882 n.6.
364. See Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New Property Regime in Human Bodies
and Body Parts, 24 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 19, 52-53 (2002) (arguing that, due to ad-
vances in biomedical technology, "substantial legal protection, analogous to the protection given to
property, is now desirable").
365. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (depublished).
366. See id. at 223-24.
367. See id.
368. See id. at 224.
369. See id. at 226.
370. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
371. Id.
372. 793 P.2d 479, 510 (Cal. 1990).
373. See id. at 480-83.
374. See id. at 497.
375. Id. at 490.
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to explain what constitutes property, but concluded that a state statute gov-
erning the disposal of human tissues and infectious waste "eliminates so
many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply
assume that what is left amounts to 'property' or 'ownership' for purposes
of conversion law. ,
376
Instrumentalist goals permeate the opinion, as evidenced by Justice
Arabian's concurrence:
Plaintiff has asked us to . . .regard the human vessel-the single
most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society-as
equal with the basest commercial commodity....
Does it uplift or degrade the "unique human persona" to treat hu-
man tissue as a fungible article of commerce? Would it advance or
impede the human condition, spiritually or scientifically, by deliv-
ering the majestic force of the law behind plaintiff's claim?3 77
The dissenting opinion by Justice Mosk delved more deeply into the na-
ture of property. Mosk took the position that, while a legal limitation or
prohibition may diminish the rights that otherwise attach to property, what
remains might still be a legally protected property interest of some sort.378
"[P]roperty or title is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immu-
nities, [so] the pruning away of some or a great many of these elements
does not entirely destroy the title. "71 Though couched in terms of sticks to
be pruned, Mosk's assessment of property is largely consistent with a con-
textual approach guided by patterning definitions. He argued that conversion
property exists, but it seems unlikely that he would take the next step and
conclude that full takings property exists in the cells of a human body.
380
376. See id. at 491-92. The patient's tort claims for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed
consent were allowed to go forward. See id. at 497.
377. Id. at 497-98 (Arabian, J., concurring). For in-depth critique of the opinion's approach to
property, see Gitter, supra note 358, at 270-78, and Penner, supra note 145, at 718-22. For an opin-
ion accepting the approach, see Washington University v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 997 (E.D.
Mo. 2006), agreeing that research participants "had parted with any semblance of ownership rights
once their biological materials had been excised for medical research."
378. Moore, 793 P.2d at 509-10 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
379. Id. at 510 (internal citation omitted).
380. See id. at 518.
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C. Culturally Significant Artwork
According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), "cultural property [is] one of the basic elements
of civilization."3"' Its exchange "increases the knowledge of . . .civiliza-
tion . . .. enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual re-
spect and appreciation among nations."382 Cultural property "include[s]
historic structures and artifacts as well as natural landscapes . . . and ob-
jects with spiritual or other intangible human associations,"383 art,3" and
arguably music. A determination of cultural significance is a controversial
undertaking best left to anthropologists and community members them-
selves rather than to lawyers. The term "culture" is itself a deeply com-
plex concept, and one of the authors has previously used the term in "ref-
erence to a particular way of life by and through which a group of people
brought together by common characteristics, such as ethnicity, religion,
language, or history, express shared behaviors and values."385 For purpos-
es of this Article, we consider only those works of visual art for which
some consensus can be reached with respect to their enduring public val-
ue.
Although a Rembrandt painting, a Michelangelo sculpture, and a Di-
ego Rivera mural can each be privately held, cultural norms in many na-
tions of the world allocate some degree of access to the public, or at least
prevent willful destruction of the artwork.386 In other words, public access
or artistic rights are deemed as important as the rights of the private hold-
er. 387 Cultural norms discourage private owners from using their Rem-
brandt painting as a dartboard or otherwise destroying it, and from exer-
cising unfettered power of exclusion over it because the activity comes at
such a high cost to human history and cultural meaning. 388 The Convention
381. Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Convention on
Cultural Property].
382. Id.; see also UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June
24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1330 (noting "the fundamental importance of the protection of cultural heritage
and of cultural exchanges for promoting understanding between peoples, and the dissemination of
culture for the well-being of humanity and the progress of civilisation. "); John Henry Merryman, The
Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 348 (1989) ("Life may be short, but art is
long. The object that endures is humanity's mark on eternity.").
383. See Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public Lands,
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 414 (2002).
384. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 382, at 349 (describing a painting as a cultural object).
385. See Zellmer, supra note 383, at 414-15 & n.4.
386. See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
CULTURAL TREASURES 21-34 (1999).
387. See id. at 22.
388. See id. at 1-2; see also Monroe E. Price, State Arts Councils: Some Items for a New Agenda,
27 HASTINGS L.J. 1183, 1188 (1976) ("[T]raditional European concepts require that ownership of a
Rembrandt does not include a right to deface the painting.").
7292008]
Alabama Law Review
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
safeguards art and other forms of cultural property from willful destruc-
tion during war.389 Meanwhile, various international conventions highlight
the need to protect art and other forms of cultural property from theft and
unlawful exportation. 3' And, for example, domestic legislation in England
and Japan protects medieval structures from destruction, restricts the ex-
portation of famous artwork, and seeks to preserve cultural properties.391
United States law identifies historic structures, objects of antiquity,
and other cultural objects as expressions of a "collective public herit-
age." 392 Federal legislation protects the moral rights of artists in certain
cases, but fails to provide direct protection for the artwork itself. 393 The
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 enables artists to protect paintings,
drawings, prints, or sculptures of "recognized stature" against modifica-
tion or destruction. 394 The public interest in the preservation of art is ad-
vanced, however, only if the artist is willing to pursue protection. 395 By
contrast, the California Preservation of Cultural and Artistic Creations Act
allows a cause of action to prevent destruction through "third-party inter-
vention by... organizations acting [in the] public interest. "396
The various domestic provisions and conventions reflect international
customary law, which gives culturally significant artwork a hybrid stature
that blurs the line "between public and private" property.3" The right to
exclude and the right to dispose of the art may be greatly restricted or
even curtailed through government regulation.3 98 No doubt, a Rembrandt
is a discrete asset of great value and owners can expect to maintain posses-
sory rights to enjoy it, to sell it, and to pass it on through inheritance, but
owners have no reasonable expectation of complete exclusivity or unfet-
tered disposition.399 The elemental strand in the web of interests-
389. See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
390. See, e.g., UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, supra
note 382; Convention on Cultural Property, supra note 381, at 232.
391. See Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property: Toward
a National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 202 (2001).
392. See id. at 178-79. For an assessment of legal treatment of historic properties and sacred sites,
see generally Zellmer, supra note 383.
393. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000). Professor Rob Denicola brought this provision, and related
provisions of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), to my attention.
394. Id. § 106A(a)(3). See generally Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 77-88 (2d. Cir.
1995) (discussing the Visual Artists Rights Act).
395. See Wilkes, supra note 391, at 192. Wilkes argues that "[tihe public trust doctrine ... could
be extended to safeguard art objects that are subjected to extensive public use." Id. at 195.
396. See id. at 192 n. 128.
397. See id. at 179; see also Marilyn E. Phelan, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects Confirms a Separate Property Status for Cultural Treasures, 5 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 31, 45 (1998).
398. See Wilkes, supra note 391, at 188-92.
399. See id. at 195-98.
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exclusivity-is severely compromised. If a government, acting for the
benefit of the public interest in preservation of culturally significant art,
prevents destruction or mutilation of the art, a takings claim should be
dismissed. The owner cannot be forced to provide access to the public at
any time, place, or manner, however, and as between two competing pri-
vate claims to the art, the owners' property rights are substantial. 4° Thus,
the owner may maintain rights to possess, enjoy, and derive value from
the art to the exclusion of competing private interests, but the exclusivity
strand is relatively weak.
D. Air
Like water, the law once treated air as both "so plentiful and so diffi-
cult to reduce to property that [it was] left open to the [general] public." 1
Clean air appeared to be an inexhaustible, "costlessly obtained asset,"4 2
making it "pointless to the point of absurdity [to recognize] property rights
in air. "" "As it turns out, however, air is neither infinitely available nor
always costlessly obtained." 4" If a power company constructs a large coal-
fired, pollution-emitting power plant in the neighborhood, those "who
live[] nearby may find [that clean] air is no longer. . . freely available.""
As with water, scarcity breeds appreciation. To recover what was lost, an
adversely affected neighbor might sue the power company under a com-
mon law theory, such as nuisance, to protect the right to peaceful use and
enjoyment of her real property interest.4" If successful, the company will
have to pay for damages to affected crops and livestock, and it may even
have to install expensive equipment to control the pollution or face an out-
right injunction of operations.407
Clean air has aspects of both a private and a public good, 40 where
consumptive uses are generally non-rivalrous and benefits of use are gen-
erally non-excludable. 409 Under the 1990 amendments to the federal Clean
400. See id. at 193-95.
401. See Rose, supra note 78, at 717-18.
402. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 58, at 577-78.
403. See id. at 578.
404. Id.
405. See id.
406. See id. at 602-03.
407. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 218 (2002). Note that, if the complaining party is not a
landowner, but simply recreates in a nearby public park, it will have a tough time having its interests
redressed under a nuisance theory. Id. § 45.
408. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 179 (1998).
409. See Bell & Parchovsky, supra note 58, at 577-78 ("Nonrivalrous consumption means that
consumption of the good by one person does not rival consumption by another .... Nonexcludability
refers to the inability of the good's owner to exclude consumers. The result of these two features of
public goods creates the need for government provision; that is, other than altruists, private persons
would provide only those goods from which they could enjoy sufficient benefits to warrant the provi-
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Air Act, "the air has been privatized [to a certain degree], insofar as pol-
lution rights are granted (and even bought and sold) by permit."410 Al-
though there is no irrevocable right to exclusive possession, limited prop-
erty rights in clean air or in using the air for waste disposal purposes may
be recognized for purposes of due process, statutory entitlements, or
common law claims.
V. INTERESTS IN WATER AS PROPERTY
Courts and commentators alike are split regarding the treatment of in-
terests in water as takings property or as a quintessential public re-
source.4" The accuracy of either position turns on the context of the dis-
pute, the underlying constitutional and statutory provisions of state law,
the case law of the jurisdiction in question, and any applicable contractual
terms that define the user's interest in water." 2 As such, it is not plausible
to assert that interests in water should always be treated as private proper-
ty or, conversely, that they should never be.413 This Part shows that, in the
majority of prior appropriation jurisdictions, interests in water can be con-
sidered due process property or common law property but not regulatory
takings property.
A. Regulatory Takings Property
The generally applicable test for determining whether a regulatory tak-
ing has occurred is whether a governmental regulation goes "too far" in
impacting private property.4 14 Once a private property right is found to
have been affected, courts employ a balancing test that considers the ef-
fects of the regulation on reasonable investment-backed expectations.415 In
rare cases where a regulatory action causes a physical invasion of the
property or denies all economically beneficial use, however, the balancing
test is not applied; rather, a per se taking will be found. 416 That is, com-
sion.").
410. See Rose, supra note 78, at 718 n.29. The new source review program also stimulates the
trade of property-like units of air pollution through a program that allows facilities to "bubble" their
emissions to stay below certain emission thresholds. See Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environ-
ment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 14 (1985).
411. See, e.g., Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, The Endangered Species
Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 571 (2002); Gray, supra note 159, at 27.
412. See Gray, supra note 159, at 26.
413. See id. at 11-12 ("The unique characteristics of the property right in water thus add layers of
complexity to the analysis of water rights takings cases that go far beyond takings cases involving land
or other types of property.").
414. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
415. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
416. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992); Loretto v. Telepromp-
ter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
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pensation must be paid unless the interest in question was already limited
by a background principle of law that inheres in the claimant's title.4" 7
Water users who allege a taking of their interests in water bear a
heavy burden of establishing compensable property rights.4"8 In most cas-
es, they will not be able to meet this burden because the law of nearly
every state gives "broad . . . regulatory powers [to] the government [to
restrict an appropriator's rights to use water where necessary] to protect
endangered species, water quality, and other environmental interests. "419
We realize that this assertion contravenes conventional wisdom. The
prior appropriation regime, as described above, is an expedient means of
determining who gets water, how much she gets, and when she gets it.42
Like various forms of private property, the protection of senior water
rights in the western United States is necessary to ensure stability and pro-
tect the value of reasonable expectations in continued use. The Nebraska
Supreme Court has described the system of distributing water according to
appropriators'
respective priorities [as] undoubtedly enacted in furtherance of a
wise public policy to afford an economical and speedy remedy to
those whose rights are wrongfully disregarded by others, as well
as to prevent waste, and to avoid unseemly controversies that may
occur where many persons are entitled to share in a limited supply
of public water.42'
Private rights to use surface water are ensconced in state constitu-
tions422 and statutes423 throughout the western states. Colorado, in particu-
lar, boasts strong property rights in water. The Colorado constitution
states that "[t]he right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural
stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied."424 Yet another provision
of that state's constitution provides that water is "the property of the pub-
lic, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject
to appropriation. "425 Colorado courts have interpreted these provisions to
mean that water rights are vested property rights. 426 As a result, Colorado
417. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
418. See Gray, supra note 159, at 12-13.
419. See id. at 26.
420. See supra Subpart II.B.
421. Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Willis, 284 N.W. 326, 329 (Neb. 1939).
422. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
423. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1011.5 (West 2004); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-102
(West 2004).
424. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6
425. Id. § 5 (emphasis added).
426. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. v. Meadow Island Ditch Co. No. 2, 132 P.3d 333, 340 (Colo.
2006); Ackerman v. City of Walsenburg, 467 P.2d 267, 270 (Colo. 1970); Brighton Ditch Co. v. City
of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (Colo. 1951). See generally Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colora-
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boasts a relatively active water market.4 27 Indeed, according to the state
Supreme Court, "[Colorado's] future well-being likely depends on contin-
ued transfers of appropriated agricultural water to other uses at other plac-
es," given the state's rapidly growing urban population and the over-
appropriated status of most of its major river basins.428
In Colorado, providing stability and securing expectations in continued
use have prevailed as a matter of law and public policy,4 29 and water rights
are firmly grounded on property law theories.4 3' The public trust doctrine
has limited import, and water rights are granted and can be transferred
with no regard for the general public interest, so long as other appropria-
tors are not harmed by the transfer.43t Accordingly, in Colorado, so long
as the use in question meets the state law requirements for continuing
beneficial use, appropriators' claims for compensation for governmental
restrictions that go "too far" are likely to avoid dismissal.432
Colorado is an anomaly among western states. Most other western
states embrace the public trust doctrine to at least some degree433 and im-
pose a public interest test on water transfers .13 Nebraska's constitution,
for example, may seem somewhat similar to Colorado's, but it contains an
important distinction: "The right to divert unappropriated waters of every
natural stream for beneficial use shall never be denied except when such
denial is demanded by the public interest.,,435 This language authorizes the
state legislature to define through statute what constitutes the "public in-
terest. ,436 Statutes require public interest review for both new appropria-
do Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1 (1997).
427. See Tom Kuhnle, Note, The Federal Income Tax Implications of Water Transfers, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 533, 540 (1995); Jedidiah Brewer, Robert Glennon, Alan Ker & Gary Libecap, Transferring
Water in the American West: 1987-2005, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1043 (2007).
428. See High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 721-22
(Colo. 2005). "Colorado has grown from two million residents in 1970 to 4.6 million today, with an
additional 2.5 million expected by 2030.... Much of this growth has been made possible by a steady
change of water rights from agriculture to municipal use." Id. at 722.
429. See Hobbs, supra note 426, at 2.
430. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Public Water-Private Water: Anti-Speculation, Water Reallo-
cation, and High Plains A&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 10 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (noting that, in Colorado, "[w]ater in the possession of an appro-
priator [is considered] 'personal property'").
431. See id. at 6.
432. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415; see also supra Subpart III.B.1 (describing
essential elements of takings property).
433. See Carol Necole Brown, Drinking From A Deep Well: The Public Trust Doctrine And West-
ern Water Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2006); Wilkinson, supra note 84, at 466.
434. See Grant, supra note 111, at 486 ("Scrutiny of proposed water uses for conformity with the
public interest is common practice in the West. All but two ... western states require public interest
review of new appropriations. More than half of these states require review in order to transfer exist-
ing appropriations to new uses.").
435. NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (emphasis added).
436. See Cent. Platte Natural Res. Dist. v. City of Fremont, 549 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Neb. 1996); In
re Applications A-16027, 495 N.W.2d 23, 31-34 (Neb. 1993); In re Application A-16642, 463
N.W.2d 591, 604-05 (Neb. 1990); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-234 (2004) ("An application [for a
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tions and changes in use or transfers to other users, and wasteful uses or
non-use for five years or more can result in cancellation or forfeiture."37
Changes in use tend to be discouraged.438 As a result, transfers are rela-
tively rare, and those that do occur typically involve small-scale transac-
tions between users with similar activities at the same or nearby loca-
tions ."
In its 2005 opinion in Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub ("Spear T Ranch
I"),o the Nebraska Supreme Court summed up the state's water law pro-
visions: "[a] right to appropriate surface water . . . is not an ownership of
property.""' As unequivocal as this sounds, the court tempered its state-
ment in the next line: "Instead, the water is viewed as a public want and
the appropriation is a right to use the water."" 2 One might view this as a
distinction without a difference because rights to water have always been
recognized as usufructuary-a right to use but not outright ownership in
the corpus of the water in situ."3 Given the usufructuary and public nature
of water rights, however, any expectation of exclusive, unfettered use in a
state like Nebraska, which is typical of most other western states, is pa-
tently unrealistic.'" At least two elements of the patterning definition for
takings property are missing or severely compromised-exclusive posses-
sion and a discrete, marketable asset." 5 The third element-an irrevocable
interest-is also compromised because appropriative rights can be forfeited
or canceled for non-use or waste." 6
The distinction between ownership of water and a mere right to use
water made a tremendous difference to the Spear T Ranch I plaintiff, "a
surface water appropriator" harmed by groundwater pumping." 7 The court
water appropriation] may . . be refused . . . when denial is demanded by the public interest."); id. §
46-289 (stating that the Director of Natural Resources may consider certain specified factors when
determining whether "an interbasin transfer [is in] the public interest").
437. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-229 (specifying that water rights are forfeited if not used for a
consecutive five-year period).
438. See id. § 46-294; NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6.
439. See WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST, supra note 106, at 18-25; ; Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-
Speculation Doctrine and its Implications for Collaborative Water Management, 7 NEV. L.J. (forth-
coming 2008) Because of the uniqueness of water and potential third-party effects, "water markets
[simply] cannot be expected to resemble more conventional markets." See Sax, supra note 79, at 13.
440. 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005).
441. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
442. Id.
443. See Richard S. Harnsberger et al., Interstate Transfers of Water: State Options after Sporhase,
70 NEB. L. REV. 754, 787 & n.139 (1991).
444. See Eric Pearson, Constitutional Restraints on Water Diversions in Nebraska: The Little Blue
Controversy, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 695, 707-08 (1983).
445. See supra Subpart IIl.B. 1 (identifying and defining the three elements of takings property).
446. See supra note 433 and accompanying text; see also In re Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d
438, 444-45 (Tex. 1982) (holding that limiting riparian rights to the maximum amount of water bene-
ficially used is not a taking because non-use is equivalent to waste and there is no right to waste wa-
ter); Dep't of Ecology v. Abbott, 694 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wash. 1985).
447. See Spear T Ranch 1, 691 N.W.2d at 124.
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rejected Spear T's attempt to protect its "property" under a theory of con-
version (an act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's property),
and left Spear T to tort remedies." 8 Without further analysis, in its subse-
quent opinion in Spear T Ranch /,"9 the court likewise dismissed Spear
T's claim against the Department of Natural Resources for a regulatory
taking of property under the Nebraska Constitution, stating simply that
Spear T had no property to be taken.450
The result in Spear T Ranch II would be the same if the patterning de-
fmnition were applied. In fact, several other state courts have rejected regu-
latory takings claims for the infringement of appropriative rights, either
because "[n]o one has any property in the water itself, but a simple usu-
fruct,"45"' or because there is no vested right in non-use or waste.452
In rejecting the appropriator's conversion claim, however, the court's
opinion in Spear T Ranch I is problematic on several levels. In Spear T
Ranch I, the court cited only groundwater-related precedent in holding that
the appropriator had no common law property interest in surface water.453
In Nebraska, groundwater is governed by a separate statutory provision,
which specifies that groundwater is a public resource for which only rea-
sonable, correlative uses on overlying land are allowed.454 Nebraska courts
have consistently held that groundwater is not subject to private owner-
ship; rather, it is owned by the state for the benefit of the public.455 In-
deed, "Nebraska law has never considered ground water to be a market
item freely transferable for value among private parties."456
In contrast, previous surface water cases had concluded that surface
water appropriators who complied with statutory requirements did in fact
possess vested property rights.457 In 1952, the Nebraska Supreme Court in
City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co.458 invalidated an ordinance
448. See id. at 127. For commentary, see J. David Aiken, Hydrologically-Connected Ground
Water, Section 858, and the Spear T Ranch Decision, 84 NEB. L. REv. 962 (2006), and Donald Blan-
kenau et al., Spear T Ranch v. Knaub: The Reincarnation of Riparianism in Nebraska Water Law, 38
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1203 (2005).
449. Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Neb. Dep't of Natural Res., 699 N.W.2d 379 (Neb. 2005).
450. See id. at 386 ("Because Spear T had no property that was damaged or taken by the Depart-
ment, Spear T could not assert a cause of action for inverse condemnation."). The court also con-
cluded that the state had no authority, much less a duty, "to regulate ground water users or administer
ground water rights for the benefit of surface water appropriators." Id.
451. See In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1087 (Or. 1924).
452. See In re Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 444-45 (Tex. 1982); Dep't of Ecology v.
Abbott, 694 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wash. 1985).
453. See Spear TRanch I, 691 N.W.2d at 127.
454. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-702 (2004).
455. See, e.g., In re Application U-2, 413 N.W.2d 290, 298 (Neb. 1987); Douglas v. Sporhase,
305 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Neb. 1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
456. Sporhase, 305 N.W.2d at 616.
457. See Joseph A. Kishiyama, Note, The Prophecy of Poor Dick: The Nebraska Supreme Court
Recognizes a Surface Water Appropriator's Claim Against a Hydrologically Connected Ground Water
User in Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 85 NEB. L. REv. 284, 285, 295-96 n.83 (2006).
458. 53 N.W.2d 543 (Neb. 1952).
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that deemed open canals to be "public nuisances," requiring owners to fill
them or construct water pipes.459 The court found that the ordinance was
an arbitrary exercise of the police power," and opined in dicta that it
would result in "confiscation of the company's property without due
process or payment of just compensation.""
The issue of surface water appropriation was addressed directly in En-
terprise Irrigation District v. Willis.62 There, the court held that a statute
that limited appropriations to three acre-feet per acre was not intended to
apply retroactively. 63 It conceded that the state may control the distribu-
tion of water to ensure beneficial use and guard against waste by virtue of
its police power,'64 but concluded that the statutory limitation could not be
applied to an appropriation that vested prior to enactment. 65 "That an ap-
propriator of public water, who has complied with existing statutory re-
quirements, obtains a vested property right has been announced by this
court on many occasions."6 6 The court continued that the state's police
power had never been expanded so far as to allow the legislature "to de-
stroy vested rights in private property when such rights are being exer-
cised and such property is being employed in the useful and in nowise
harmful production of wealth [unless use of the property is] inimical to
public health or morals or to the general welfare."467 These two cases sup-
port the conclusion that an appropriator's interest in surface water can be
property for the purposes of at least some types of claims.
Likewise, in Nebraska, 68 and other western states,"' compensation
has been required for the outright condemnation of surface water rights.
These results could be justified, perhaps, by considering the disparate pur-
poses and history of eminent domain powers. Prior to Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,47° no compensation was required for regulations that pro-
tected public health, morals, or general welfare so long as the regulations
were authorized by the police power, no matter how much the regulations
affected the value of private property.47 For eminent domain purposes, an
"owner" typically encompasses any person having "an estate, title, or
interest, including beneficial, possessory, and security interest, in a prop-
459. See id. at 545-46, 551.
460. See id. at 549-50.
461. See id. at 547.
462. 284 N.W. 326, 329 (Neb. 1939).
463. See id. at 329-31.
464. See id. at 330.
465. See id. at 331.
466. Id. at 329.
467. Id. at 330 (internal citation omitted).
468. See, e.g., Loup River Pub. Power Dist. v. North Loup River Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist.,
.)I. WI .W.2. ti (tlob. 19-t4).
469. See, e.g., Sullivan v. City of Ulysses, 932 P.2d 456, 460 (Kan. 1997).
470. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
471. See Treanor, supra note 200, at 797.
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erty sought to be condemned," and property, in turn, includes all "land,
buildings, structures, tenements, hereditaments, easements, tangible and
intangible property, and property rights whether real, personal, or mixed,
including fluid mineral and gas rights."472 In modern eminent domain cas-
es, however, challengers typically focus on valuation of the property or,
more fundamentally, whether condemnation has been for a public purpose,
not whether property is in fact concerned.473
Perhaps Spear T Ranch P74 evidences an evolution in the law to reflect
modern social values, or perhaps the opinion is simply a more reasoned
application of the long-standing notion that water is "a public want.""'
Whether an emerging trend in the law is a deviation from or merely a ref-
lection of background principles of property law is an issue often raised in
regulatory takings discussions.476 In United States v. Rands,477 the Supreme
Court concluded that landowners adjacent to the Columbia River had no
property rights as against the United States in anything subject to the navi-
gational servitude, including the flow of the water in the river, access to
the water, and other values attributable to proximity to water.4 78 "[T]hese
rights and values are not assertable against the superior rights of the Unit-
ed States, [and] are not property within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment. ,479
Outside of the navigational servitude context, the federal courts have
been wildly inconsistent regarding takings claims brought by appropriators
with state-sanctioned water rights. In one case involving the use of water
on a federal grazing allotment, the Court of Federal Claims found that
there was no property right in the grazing permit itself, but remanded for a
resolution of whether the claimant had satisfied state and federal require-
ments for a vested property right in the water.48°
472. Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 213.51(0, 213.51(i)
(West 1998); see also ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 80 (1987)
("The term property has been successively broadened to include all types of interests in land, stret-
ching beyond fee title to include leaseholds, future interests, materialman's liens, contracts-in other
words, all rights to use, dispose of, and enjoy dominion over property."); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Do-
main § 56 (2007) ("Generally .... eminent domain extends to every species of property . . . and to
every variety and degree of interest therein, or at least extends to all private property [including] real
estate [and] all kinds of personal property, and even intangible or incorporeal rights.").
473. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484-86, 489-90 (2005). For purposes
of this Article, we do not attempt to resolve the eminent domain question.
474. 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005).
475. See id. at 127; see also Duncan, supra note 71, at 795 ("Individual interests in water . . .
must ... be used consistently with the larger public good, which itself evolves over time to reflect
changing public needs and values.").
476. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 323, 368 (2005).
477. 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
478. See id. at 126-27.
479. Id. at 126.
480. See Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 172-73, 180 (1996).
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Flowing water presents unique ownership issues because it is not
amenable to absolute physical possession. Unlike real property,
water is only rarely a fixed quantity in a fixed place. Nevertheless,
the right to appropriate water can be a property right. Amici pro-
vides no reason within our constitutional tradition why water
rights, which are as vital as land rights, should receive less protec-
tion. . . .This court holds that water rights are not "lesser" or
"diminished" property rights unprotected by the Fifth Amend-
ment. Water rights, like other property rights, are entitled to the
full protection of the Constitution.48'
The issue of whether the right to appropriate water is a property right
was placed squarely before the claims court in Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District v. United States.482 The court awarded irrigators $26 mil-
lion when the Bureau of Reclamation curtailed contract allowances from a
state project that shared a coordinated pumping system with a reclamation
project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.483 Deliveries were restricted
from 1992-1994 in order to provide flow for endangered species. 4' The
Tulare court concluded, without much analysis, that the irrigators had
legally protected property rights in water deliveries under California law
and that a reduction in deliveries effectuated a per se taking.485 Although
there was "no dispute that [the supplier's] permits, and in turn plaintiffs'
contract rights, are subject to the doctrines of reasonable use and public
trust and to the tenets of state nuisance law," the court concluded that only
the state Water Resources Control Board could modify the permit terms to
reflect changing needs. 486 Because the Board had not done so during the
period in question, the court declined to in essence modify the permit it-
self, stating that the laws "require a complex balancing of interests [and]
an exercise of discretion for which this court is not suited and with which
it is not charged. , 4
87
The Tulare opinion has been roundly criticized for, among other
things, failing to analyze whether California water law or the relevant con-
481. Id. at 172. The court concluded that, "[s]ubject to reasonable regulation, if plaintiffs' water
rights have priority over defendant's rights, plaintiffs, as senior appropriators, have a right to utilize
their total volume of water before defendant has any right to utilize their water rights [per] 43 U.S.C.
§ 661 (water rights vested under local law are protected)," and remanded the claim for an application
of § 661 and Nevada water law. See id. at 172-73, 180.
482. 49 Fed. CI. 313 (2001).
483. See U.S. Owes Farmers $26 Million, Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at 8, available
at 2004 WLNR 19791464.
484. See Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 315-16.
485. See id. at 318 ("Thus, we see plaintiffs' contract rights in the water's use as superior to all
competing interests. It is a property interest . . . .Turning then to the merits of plaintiffs' claim, we
being by determining the nature of the taking alleged.")
486. See id. at 324.
487. See id. at 323-24.
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tracts created a property right.488 The opinion refused to recognize either
the public trust doctrine or California's constitutional requirement that
uses of water be both beneficial and reasonable as an inherent limitation
on title.489 California courts have consistently construed California law to
mean that the state owns all of the water in the state, in a supervisory
sense, and although water rights holders have the right to use water, they
do not own the water and cannot waste it. 4" Once it had determined that a
property right existed, the claims court jumped to the conclusion that the
government regulation had effectuated a per se physical occupation of the
water requiring compensation.49' As Professor Brian Gray explained,
[r]eluctant to delve into the nuances of the reasonable use and pub-
lic trust doctrines, the Court of Federal Claims seized on [the
Board's previous decision to grant the permit] as the conclusive
definition of the water rights. . . . In essence, the court decided
that an appropriator is legally entitled to engage in (and has prop-
erty rights to) any conduct that is authorized by its water rights
permit or license. This interpretation oversimplifies-and therefore
misapprehends-the nature of California water rights.492
The claims court reached the opposite conclusion a few years later in
Klamath Irrigation District v. United States.493 There, summary judgment
was granted to the United States on the grounds that any interest irrigators
had in Reclamation water was contractual in nature, and not property.' 94
Accordingly, the irrigators were left with only contract remedies when
488. See, e.g., David B. Anderson, Water Rights as Property in Tulare v. United States, 38
McGeorge L. Rev. 461, 462-64 (2007).
489. See Gray, supra note 159, at 9. The California Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use
to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters
is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of
the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or
from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as
shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and
shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unrea-
sonable method of diversion of water.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. This provision encompasses both surface and groundwater resources. See
Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 495 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
490. See, e.g., Cent. & W. Basin, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. Although Central & West Basin con-
strued Art. X, § 2 in the context of a groundwater dispute, the court's analysis seems to sweep broadly
enough to encompass all waters, including surface waters. See id. at 496-97.
491. See Tulare Lake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 318-19.
492. See Gray, supra note 159, at 9.
493. 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005). For a critique of the Klamath opinion, see Grant, supra note 130, at
1354-60.
494. See 67 Fed. Cl. at 527, 535-37, 540.
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deliveries were curtailed to provide flows for endangered fish species.' 95
The court explicitly criticized the Tulare opinion for failing to assess the
underlying nature of the interest in question to discern whether the plain-
tiffs in fact possessed property rights: "Tulare appears to be wrong on
some counts, incomplete in others and, distinguishable, at all events."49
Notably, the public trust doctrine in California forms a fundamental
component of the water rights system as an inherent limitation on interests
in water, the exercise of which is not a taking. 4" California law is distinct
from most other western states, however, in that the California code has
been construed as providing the Board with continuing jurisdiction over
water permits to ensure continuing compliance with the public trust.498
Few if any state boards or agencies have a parallel authority, but they are
all charged with remaining vigilant against forfeiture or waste, and most
are required to scrutinize new appropriations and transfers to ensure that
the public interest is satisfied.499
The web metaphor, with its complementary patterning definition for
takings property, vividly illustrates the wisdom of the Klamath opinion
and the fallacy of Tulare. The webframe, representing the public trust
doctrine, empowers the state, as trustee, to safeguard the public interest in
water supplies and water-dependent resources. The appropriator, with a
state-sanctioned interest in using the water, occupies one of the concentric
strands radiating from the center of the web, and holds one of the spoke-
like strands attaching the thing (the water) to the webframe-a durable,
usufructuary right. But the exclusivity strand is compromised, and there is
no discrete asset that can be routinely conveyed or disposed of however
the appropriator wishes. Like competitors' interest in distributing the
news, appropriators possess a right to preclude other appropriators from
using water, as well as a procedural due process right against capricious
government action, but this is not a full private property right entitled to
compensation for a regulatory taking." °°
495. See id. at 532. The court subsequently held that the "sovereign acts doctrine" provided a
complete defense to the irrigator's contract claims against the Bureau. See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v.
United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677, 695 (2007).
496. See Klamath, 67 Fed. Cl. at 538. The claims court reached a similar result in Casitas Munici-
pal Water District v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (2007), where the same judge that decided
Tulare concluded that, under Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), "only the government's active hand in the redirection of a property's
use may be treated as a per se taking."
497. See Benson, supra note 411, at 571-73.
498. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 730-31 (Cal. 1983).
499. See Grant, supra note 111, at 486 (reporting that only two of the western states fail to compel
new appropriations to undergo a public interest review prior to permit issuance, while roughly half of
the states allow transfers of existing appropriations without public interest review).
500. See supra Subpart W.A.
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B. Procedural Due Process Property
The patterning definition for due process property requires that a
claimant possess "an entitlement having a monetary value that can be ter-
minated only upon a finding that some specific condition has been satis-
fied. "501 Although a discrete, marketable asset is not necessary, a cogniza-
ble legal right to exclude others from interfering with a valuable interest-
an entitlement with discernible boundaries-is required." 2
Prior appropriation water rights that have vested by application to
beneficial use have been accorded procedural due process. In Sheep Moun-
tain Cattle Co. v. Department of Ecology,"3 the court construed a water
right as property for due process purposes."° The court found that the
state violated procedural due process by issuing a termination order with-
out providing notice or a hearing to a water rights holder who had failed to
show continuous beneficial use of the water.50 5 Because the court set aside
the termination order on due process grounds, it was unnecessary to con-
sider whether a taking of private property had also occurred. 6 In a pre-
vious case, however, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that no
taking had occurred when latent water rights reverted to the state by op-
eration of state forfeiture laws."
Other state courts have likewise concluded that procedural safeguards
are required before cancellation of water rights occurs. 508 Prior appropria-
tors have also been provided with due process in general stream adjudica-
tions that could adversely affect their interests.509 Vested appropriation
rights are cognizable legal interests in valuable property, subject to protec-
tion from interference by contravening users.510 Thus, they qualify as legi-
timate, discernible entitlements for procedural due process purposes.5"
501. See Merrill, supra note 30, at 961.
502. See supra Subpart III.B.2.
503. 726 P.2d 55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
504. See id. at 57.
505. See id.
506. See id.
507. Dep't of Ecology v. Abbott, 694 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wash. 1985).
508. See, e.g., Speer v. Stephenson, 102 P. 365, 371-73 (Idaho 1909) (finding that due process
was satisfied by statute providing for the recording in the state engineer's office of a permit to appro-
priate water and requiring notice to be given to all persons shown to have an interest in the permit by
the state engineer's records); Engelmann v. Westergard, 647 P.2d 385, 388-89 (Nev. 1982) (holding
that a permittee's due process rights were not violated where he did not receive actual notice regarding
cancellation of his permits but state engineer advised permittee by certified letter, which was later
returned "unclaimed").
509. See, e.g., In re Rights to the Use of the Gila River, 830 P.2d 442, 450 (Ariz. 1992).
510. See Dennis J. Herman, Note, Sometimes There's Nothing Left to Give: The Justification for
Denying Water Service to New Consumers to Control Growth, 44 STAN. L. REv. 429, 461-63 (1992).
511. See id.
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C. Common Law Property
The Nebraska Supreme Court's bold stance that "[a] right to appropri-
ate surface water ... is not an ownership of property"5 12 is legally defens-
ible as between an appropriator and the state in the regulatory takings con-
text. However, neither the web metaphor nor the patterning definition
justifies the dismissal of property-based claims for private interference.
An appropriator's interest in the continued use of available surface wa-
ter vis-h-vis other water users is the very essence of the prior appropria-
tion system.513 As between users, a person holding a senior appropriative
water right has an exclusive right to use a specified amount of available
water for a specified purpose at a specified time and place.514 Surely, then,
a water right has some incidents of property that can and should be pro-
tected from interfering water users. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
explains that "'legally protected interest' [(which must exist for conversion
to occur)] denotes the existence of a property interest that the law will
protect against destruction" or misappropriation.515 Although usufructuary
interests, depicted as an elemental strand within the web of interests, are
non-exclusive and not irrevocable, they are robust enough to be considered
a form of property for resolving disputes between users.516 Absent proper-
ty, parties are left with negligence, contract, or other types of liability
claims, some of which may be far more difficult to prove and, in the end,
may fail to provide a satisfactory remedy.517
Conversion, although rejected outright in Spear T Ranch,518 seems an
appropriate claim for an aggrieved water right holder. At common law,
conversion offers a remedy for a property right holder against unlawful
possession, impairment, or destruction of her property by another.5"9 The
Spear T Ranch I court recognized that "[tiortious conversion is any dis-
tinct act of dominion wrongfully asserted over another's property in denial
of or inconsistent with that person's rights. "520 Troubled by the usufruc-
mary nature of surface water rights, the court concluded that, "[b]ecause
Spear T does not have a property interest in its surface water appropriation
and only has a right to use, it cannot state a claim for conversion or tres-
512. Spear T. Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 127 (Neb. 2005).
513. See James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interference with the Use of Water: Do
Unconstitutional "Takings" Occur?, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 1, 33 (2005).
514. See Freyfogle, supra note 195, at 1541 ("[A] water right is ... merely the right to continue a
particular, existing pattern of water use ... with a specific economic and social result").
515. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927 cmt. a. (1979); see also supra Subpart III.B.3
(providing elements of common law conversion property).
516. See Fig. 1, supra.
517. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 71, at 715-16. ; supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text
518. See Spear T. Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 126-27 (Neb. 2005).
519. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927 cmt. a.
520. Spear TRanch 1, 691 N.W.2d at 126-27.
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pass."52 But the requisite legally protected interest is present-the water
right holder's ability to divert and beneficially use a certain amount of
water for a specified purpose, before and instead of other water users in a
system. 22 The conclusion that Spear T had no common law property in its
water right 23 undermines the very basis of the prior appropriation sys-
tem-the ability to assert a water right against another would-be water
user. Using Merrill's patterning definitions and the web as a metaphor to
conceptualize property interests in water helps to avoid this drastic out-
come and, in turn, promotes an equitable and realistic view of the prior
appropriation system that comports with rule of law objectives of consis-
tency and coherence.
CONCLUSION
Whether something is treated as property has significant on-the-ground
effects and marked legal consequences. Water is no exception. Over-
appropriation has become an intractable problem in many western water-
sheds. This is not surprising, given that the basic premise of western water
law is to maximize use by leaving no drop behind.524 By perpetuating the
myth of unfettered private property rights in water, prior appropriation has
caused rapid depletion of the resource and, in some cases, the collapse of
entire riparian communities.525 Meanwhile, water rights holders are pena-
lized for conservation and motivated to use as much water as possible.526
Governments have been loath to encourage innovation by revising the ap-
propriative system"' and are equally reluctant to impose restrictions that
protect ecological interests for fear of regulatory takings claims .28
Understanding private and public rights in water can lead to a more
nuanced understanding of the nature of property as a legal norm. Property
has a complex history, laced with metaphor but sparse on bright line defi-
nitions. The result has been confusion over what should be considered
property, with differing interpretations and contradictory results in courts
at every level. Using Merrill's patterning definitions and a new metaphor
521. Id. at 127.
522. See, e.g., S. Tex. Water Co. v. Bieri, 247 S.W.2d 268, 271-73 (Tex. 1952) (finding that an
irrigation company was not entitled to collect on a lien it had placed on the plaintiff's crop under a
theory of conversion, where the company failed to show that it had any lawful right to use, control, or
possess water used by the plaintiff, which had been taken from drainage ditches outside the company's
permit area).
523. See Spear T Ranch I, 691 N.W.2d at 127.
524. See Freyfogle, Common Wealth, supra note 18, at 28; Neuman, supra note 111, at 975.
525. See Freyfogle, Common Wealth, supra note 18, at 40, 50 ("Far from being efficient in free-
market economic terms, prior appropriation is highly wasteful.").
526. See Neuman, supra note 111, at 976-77.
527. See id. at 987-88.
528. See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90-91 (1995).
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for property-the web of interests-helps to order and apply coherent rules
to property-based disputes over water and other things. Merrill's nested
test, requiring an irrevocable interest in exclusive possession and use of
discrete marketable assets for the strongest form of property, enables us
both to discern constitutionally protected property for regulatory takings
purposes and to identify more limited property interests for purposes of
due process or common law claims. The patterning definitions, aided by
the web of interests metaphor, provide a new way of conceptualizing
property. Rather than a lifeless bundle of sticks-a disparate collection of
separate rights or relationships-the web fixes the thing in question at the
center of the dispute and draws our attention to the nature of the thing
itself and the connections among actors with interests in that thing.
These two dynamic tools-the patterning definitions and the web me-
taphor-are most helpful for identifying property on the margins. Water
rights, in particular, are unique because of strong public trust values and
water's ephemeral, yet essential, nature. Viewing interests in water
through the web demonstrates that a water right is a form of common law
property as asserted against another water user but is not takings property
as against the government wielding its regulatory powers on behalf of the
public trust. The web metaphor explains this result by drawing our atten-
tion to public trust requirements, which form the all-encompassing web-
frame, and the innate physical limitations of water, portrayed at the center
of the web itself. The web metaphor illustrates that private usufructuary
interests must yield to collective interests of the public and the government
acting on behalf of the public trust. The patterning definitions further cla-
rify the nature of property in water. In most prior appropriation states,
water users cannot claim exclusive possession and control of a discrete,
marketable asset. This precludes water users from having takings proper-
ty, but it does not preclude them from, having due process or common law
property.
In order for water users to execute water transfers, engage in water
banking, conserve streamflows, or participate in a myriad of beneficial
uses, it is important to have a clear characterization of which incidents of
property inhere in a water right. Moreover, adequate remedies for real
world disputes between users must be available for the legal system to
function and to evolve in a fashion that promotes both stability and the full
range of values associated with water. The web of interests metaphor,
coupled with complementary patterning definitions of property, provides a
powerful heuristic tool for resolving disputes over water and other things
at the margins of property law.
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